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Purpose:  By using classifications of different kinds of insiders we wish to enlighten 
this area of study with empirical evidence of how insiders on the Swedish 
Stock Exchange yield abnormal returns. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, we seek to introduce a classification of insider transaction not 
used on Swedish data before with cluster transactions. Ultimately, the pur-
pose is to see in what sense outside investor are able to earn abnormal re-
turns by imitating the different classifications of insiders. 
 
Methodology:  This study is conducted with a quantitative approach and has used an event 
study framework. A division of the original sample is made in form of firm 
size, industry classification and phase of business cycle. Statistical tests are 
performed to determine if the results are significant.  
 
Theoretical perspectives:  Theories covered in the study are for example information asymmetry, ef-
ficient market hypothesis and signalling hypothesis.  
 
Empirical foundation: 125 657 buy- and sell transactions made by insiders on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm between the years of 2005-2014 are studied. The original sam-
ple has been scanned for cluster formation, where 2 659 were detected. The 
study investigates all transactions undertaken by insiders from Large-, 
Mid- and Small Cap-companies. Also, delisted companies are included. 
   
Conclusion: Cluster formations prove to be a strong signal for outsiders in terms earning 
abnormal returns. Mid- and Small Cap-companies show larger abnormal 
returns than Large Cap-companies, thus leading to the conclusion of a pre-
vailing information asymmetry across smaller firms. Transactions con-
ducted during years of expansion are more informative than those per-
formed during years of recession. Sales clusters have a larger explanatory 
power than purchase clusters. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, an introduction of the subject will be given. The problem discussion and 
the purpose of the study will be discussed. The aim is to give the reader a clear insight into the 
topic of the study and a curiosity to continue exploring the subject   
1.1 Background 
“For 12 out of the last 18 years, the fund has outperformed the market with a yearly average 
being 13 percent better than the benchmark index” 
The quote is taken from Didner & Gerge’s year-end letter from 2014 and describes the com-
pany’s return for its Swedish equity fund, investing in traded Swedish firms. What it further 
illustrates is the fascinating phenomenon of certain investors, constantly seeming to beat the 
average return of the market. The perhaps most famous example of this is presumably Warren 
Buffet and his conglomerate Berkshire Hathaway. The company has had a staggering return of 
1 826 163%, or an annual return of 22%, since 1965 (shareholder letter Berkshire Hathaway 
2014). How is this possible? The answer is that the Swedish market, like the American or any 
other market, suffers from imperfections. Many questions can be raised on how practically this 
practically is done. In order to constantly exceed the market, the information available to dif-
ferent investors within market cannot be in balance with the firms holding it. If one was to beat 
the market, it would not only mean extraordinary returns, it would also go against one of the 
most famous researchers within the field of efficient financial markets, Eugene Fama. Fama 
developed the efficient market hypothesis in 1970 stating that it is not possible to beat the mar-
ket since all information is already incorporated in the current stock price. As expected with 
controversial theories, counterparts who also studied the financial market came to opposite con-
clusions, opening up for new angles to study. Situations referring to different levels of infor-
mation knowledge can be derived to the terms of outsiders and insiders. Outsiders being the 
uninformed investors without insight to firms and striving to achieve that extra return on capital. 
Insiders on the other hand, are persons closely affiliated to the management of the company and 
thus enjoying the benefits of being involved with the decision-making. Do insiders have larger 
possibilities of achieving extra return on their investments? Intuitively, one would think so. 
Who but the insiders know when their company’s stock price is undervalued compared to what 
the bright future will bring? Naturally, insiders are allowed to trade their company’s stock. This 
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trading is called insider trading. In the following study the authors will examine outsiders’ abil-
ity to imitate insiders in hope of extra earnings, measured as abnormal returns. Abnormal return 
is incurred in cases of trading in a public company’s stock, made by individuals with access to 
non-public information (Keim 1983). A readers mind can possibly, and logically, be lead to 
illegal activities when first hearing about insider trading. This is a common interpretation and 
a consequence of a skein of insider trading scandals. There are numerous example of this in 
Swedish news reporting, including Cevianmannen and Nordeamannen (Svenska Dagbladet 
2010). Both had acted on insider information and consequently made money from using non-
public information. A common problem with the subject is the difficulty deciding whether it is 
illegal or legal, partly because of the unawareness if the insider person uses illegal or legal 
information. This study will only investigate the legal part of insider trading and the laws and 
regulations controlling this will be presented further in chapter 2.   
1.2 Problem Discussion 
Insider trading as an academic subject and research topic experienced a surge during the 1980’s 
and numerous studies have been made in order to conclude if insiders’ transactions, and earn-
ings from them, are possible to quantify in order to gain abnormal returns. A keystone in the 
academic angle of insider trading is the theory of information asymmetry. George A. Akerlof 
wrote an article, “The market for lemons”, that became a leading example of information asym-
metry using a reference to customers buying cars without knowing all available information. 
Akerlof’s simple illustration of car owners might be applied on any buyer on any market and 
so also buyers of stocks, referring to the previously mentioned outsiders and insiders. Assuming 
that outsiders, in case of information asymmetry, possess less information than insiders, it can 
be discussed if outsiders not naturally strive to reach the insiders’ information position and 
moreover, how this can be done. From combining the theory of information asymmetry with 
the previous mentioned efficient market hypothesis, the research field of insider trading 
emerged.  
The academic field of insider trading covers a wide range of perspectives and the lines of ap-
proaches are as many as there as there are reseachers. Seyhun, one of the most cited researchers 
within the field has shown that insiders earn abnormal return from their investments. However, 
insiders earning abnormal returns has been conclude in a broad spectrum of studies, whereas 
the focus more recently has shifted towards outsiders ability of earning abnormal return by 
imitating insiders. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Iqbal and Shetty (2002) have concluded that 
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the larger the company, the less abnormal return is possible to achieve when mimicking insiders 
transactions. Hence, the meaning of this is the smaller the company, the greater the possibility 
for outsiders to mimic insiders and thus retaining abnormal returns. An indication from these 
previous studies is that larger firms possibly possess a stronger form of information transpar-
ency and therefore suffers less from information asymmetry, which eliminates the possibility 
of earning abnormal return. Different subsamples have been tested in order to pinpoint which 
settings are most likely to provide evidence of abnormal return. One hypothesis that has been 
tested multiple times on multiple markets is whether a higher level of involvement with the 
company is synonymous higher abnormal return. Seyhun (1988) confirmed the hypothesis and 
established that CEO’s earned significantly higher abnormal return than more remote insider 
(typically larger shareholders). More so, he found evidence that any rational investor could gain 
an edge by mimicking insiders and thus earning abnormal return. Once again Seyhun acceded 
to other researchers with the conclusion that the signals stemming from insider trading exist. 
Not only is it stated that insiders have the ability to use their advantage of information asym-
metry in purpose of earning abnormal returns but also that outsiders have the ability to mimic 
insiders and by doing so earning abnormal returns.  
In order to find the strongest signals leading to highest possible abnormal returns, researchers 
such as Seyhun (1988) and Jeng (2003) have applied an approach of identifying clusters from 
insider transactions. Detecting clusters, defined as transactions made by insiders in their com-
pany’s stock during a specified period of time, and analyzing the clusters instead of every single 
transaction showed very strong indications of abnormal returns. By defining different subsam-
ples, the authors of this study therefore decided to apply a clusters approach on the Swedish 
market. 
Apart from the vast number of articles that has been published, an abundance of master theses 
have been written, of which many focus on the possibility to gain abnormal returns by mimick-
ing insiders’ buy transactions. However, there are two shortcomings of most studies, first one 
being the need to incorporate sale transactions, which should be considered of equal importance 
as purchase transactions. Second, most studies do not pay heed to transaction costs, that is the 
spread between buy- and sell prices and brokerage fees. The two shortcomings will therefore 
be taken into consideration in this study. 
In ability to incorporate the different theories of for example information asymmetry and the 
efficient market hypothesis, the analysis of the Swedish stock market has been made on a deep 
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set of data. Transactions from all companies traded on the Large-, Mid- and Small Cap lists of 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm are included in the dataset. Also, companies delisted any time dur-
ing the time period 2005-2014 are incorporated when conducting statistical tests. The dataset 
of cluster transactions including both buy and sell transactions will moreover be tested in three 
different subsamples.  
The following subsamples will be used in order to see seek an answer to under which conditions 
outsiders are most likely to experience abnormal returns: 
 
 Size of firm  
 Industry classification 
 Phase of business cycle 
 
The authors strive to, with help of the above-presented subsamples, answer the question of; are 
outsider investor who imitate insiders’ buy- and sell cluster formations able to obtain abnormal 
returns, with empirical evidence from the Swedish stock exchange?  
1.3 Purpose of the study 
By using a classification of different kinds of insiders we wish to enlighten this area of study 
with empirics of how insiders on the Swedish Stock Exchange yield abnormal returns. Further-
more, and perhaps more importantly, we seek to introduce a classification of insiders transac-
tion not used on Swedish data before with cluster transactions. Ultimately, the purpose is to see 
in what sense outside investor are able to earn abnormal returns by imitating the above-men-
tioned classifications of insiders. 
1.4 Demarcations 
The authors of this study have made the demarcation of only investigating companies listed on 
the Swedish market. The reason for not increasing the focus to several countries is that insiders’ 
reporting duties differ due to differences in legislation between countries. Hence, a comparative 
study would not be meaningful, and the more narrow approach is justified by the depth of this 
study and its three subsamples. 
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1.5 Outline of the study  
Chapter 2 Laws 
and Regulations
• The second chapter will provide the reader with necessary information 
of  what an insider is, as stipulated by the law. The chapter also includes 
a summary of  authorities governing the financial markets in Sweden .  
Chapter 3 
Theoretical 
Framework
• The chapter begins with a walkthrough of  economic theories that are 
relevant for the study. They constitute of  Random Walk, Signaling, 
Efficient Market Hypothesis & Information Assymmetry. A discussion 
of  the theories will constitue the last part of  the chapter.
Chapter 4 
Empirical 
Reserach
• The fourth chapter will be devoted to previous studies conducted 
within the field of  insider trading. What have been the most common 
results of  previous research? The chapter will end with a discussion of  
the previous studies.   
Chapter 5 
Methodology
• Chapter five will begin with a sample presentation and what 
subdefinition that this study makes. An outline of  the conducted event 
study will be given large space. The chapter ends with a discussion of  
the chosen methods and statistical tests.  
Chapter 6  
Results and 
Analysis
• The sixth chapter starts with descriptives statistics consisting of  a 
presentation of  the signals that has been tested. Thereafter, the results 
from the conducted tests follow. The test results are presented in detail 
and followed by necessary analysis.
Chapter 7 
Discussion and 
Conclusion
• The seventh chapter is devoted to a thoruough discussion of  the results 
of  the study, and its contribution to prevailing literature. With a critical 
standpoint the authors seeks to answer the study's relevance and 
importance.  
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Chapter 2 Laws and Regulations 
The second chapter aims at providing the reader with the necessary insight in terms of what an 
insider is and how the legislation defines the term. Also, the authorities that govern the Swedish 
capital markets will be covered. The legislative framework is a thorough subject, whereas this 
chapter will only cover the statutory rules of insiders’ reporting duties and obligations. The 
relevance of this chapter should not be underestimated as the context of this study rests upon 
the legal framework of insiders.  
 
2.1 What is an insider? 
As outlined in the first chapter, an insider is a person with close affiliation to the management 
of a company. However, as cryptic as this may sound, there are two laws in Sweden that aim at 
clarifying what an insider is and what the consequence will be of breaking the laws governing 
an insider’s rights and duties. These laws will be presented below. Also, it is important to keep 
in mind that anyone who is not defined as an insider becomes an outsider per se. 
2.1.1 The Act concerning Reporting Obligations for Certain Holdings of Financial 
Instruments (SFS 2000:1087) 
The Act concerning Reporting Obligations for Certain Holdings of Financial Instruments is the 
main legal source regarding the definition of what an insider person is. The law prescribes an 
insider as someone who is considered very likely to possess insider information of a company. 
It could either be from the persons’ position within the company or its subsidiaries or any other 
form of affiliation with the company. (Finansinspektionen)  
The following persons are classified as insiders by § 3 of the Act: 
 
 A member or alternate member of the board 
 An executive director within company 
 Large shareholder (>10 % of the total stock) 
 Auditors 
 Others (family members) 
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Any closely related person to either of above-mentioned parties is considered of having equal 
insider position by § 5 (SFS 2000:187) and thereby stands up to the same reporting duty. 
Consequently, anyone who is engaged in the decision making of the company is regarded as an 
insider. 
2.1.2 Market Abuse Penal Act (SFS 2005:377) 
The Market Abuse Penal Act came into force in 2005 as a result of the perplexity of the by then 
outdated Insider’s Penal Act (2000:186). The Market Abuse Penal Act is the most central law 
concerning insider trading and consists of the following parts (only those that are relevant for 
the study are mentioned): (Finansinspektionen) 
 
 Prohibition on trading: Anyone who fulfills the requirements of being considered an 
insider with regards to the terms specified in section (§ 3 from SFS 2000:1087) is not 
allowed to buy or sell shares or any of its equivalents during a period of up to 30 days 
prior to any form earnings report or equivalent. 
 Unauthorised disclosure of insider information 
 Improper influence on share prices 
 
Violating any of the above-mentioned criteria comes with punitive legal actions as outlined in 
chapter 2 § 1. As the data that this study intends to investigate consists of observations from 
2005 and onwards no precautions have been made in order to facilitate the potential conflict of 
insiders’ reporting obligations under the previous law. 
2.2 Legal aspect of insider trading 
Sometimes insider trading is a term that is associated with a confusion of concepts with the 
interpretation of insiders pursuing illegal actions. The correct definition is however a term that 
includes both legal and illegal conducts (Finansinspektion). One should note that this study 
does not seek to investigate the relevance of different definitions, as has been done before by 
Maug (2002). He conclude that insider trading greatly contribute to the market efficiency by 
providing outsiders with information. Previous studies have shown that illegal insider conduct 
is a widespread phenomenon and that there are a large number of unreported cases 
(Bhattacharya & Daouk). However, many scholars consider the surge of reported case in Swe-
den an effect of a restraint of the, at the time, lagging legislation. The monitoring of the Swedish 
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capital markets is collaboration between two authorities that co-function in order to make sure 
that laws are followed. The Financial Supervisory Authority has somewhat more of a monitor-
ing obligation and the Economic Crime Authority has a broader scope with both investigation 
and prosecution units. Both will be briefly discussed below. 
2.3 Sweden’s Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) 
The Financial Supervisory Authority is a statutory body established in 1991 that seeks to mon-
itor all forms of market manipulation. The authority supervises companies on the Swedish fi-
nancial market, aiming to encourage stability and efficiency in the financial systems as well as 
establishing customer protection. All firms offering financial services, requires a permit granted 
by the Financial Supervisory Authority. In addition to issue general advices and regulations, 
the Financial Supervisory Authority also controls compliance with the Swedish insider act. Re-
garding the Swedish insider act, they are responsible for controlling that companies obey the 
regulations stated. The Financial Supervisory Authority act preventive towards suspected of-
fences and share price manipulations. The laws discussed previously mentioned constitute the 
framework that companies need to follow and if they are suspected not to, the Financial Super-
visory Authority is responsible to investigate their acts. (Finansinspektionen)  
2.4 Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) 
The National Economic Crimes Bureau is a national authority dedicated to preventing all as-
pects of economic crimes and consists of a wide range of professionals, who jointly work to-
gether targeting specific target areas where insider-trading falls under what is called Market 
abuse crimes. The Economic Crime Authority has its equivalents in the Serious Fraud Office 
in the UK and Ökokrim in Norway, however with the clear distinction being that the Swedish 
counterpart has a much wider scope of actions and handles all investigations in the field of 
serious economical criminality. Normally, if the Financial Supervisory Authority suspects or 
discover plausible transaction, the case will be handed over to a special unit within EBM, who 
will further investigate and take the case to a prosecutor within the organization. 
2.5 Discussion of the laws and regulations 
The most important feature of this chapter is the definition of what an insider is. As stated in 
SFS 2000:1087, an insider could be anyone who possesses insider information of the company. 
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A valid resulting question is: what is insider information then? The answer to that is more am-
biguous and not specified in the statute book. However, the most likely interpretation is that 
insider information is information that has significant influence on the future of the company 
and is to be regarded as information having an influence on the stock price (Finansinspektio-
nen). However, some persons are always considered as being insider by Swedish legislation. 
These are members of the board, executives, large shareholders, auditors or anyone closely 
affiliated to the mentioned parties. It’s the transactions made by these persons that function as 
a foundation for this study. On a separate note, it is worth to remember that only insider trans-
action that has been reported will be used in this study. There might a number of unreported 
cases, but as these cases are impossible to quantify they will not constitute any further research 
in this study
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Chapter 3 Theoretical frame of reference 
This chapter will describe the theoretical framework for the study. The most relevant theories 
will be described and discussed. The theories that will be covered are all classical economic 
theories and these theories will form the foundation for the continuation of the study. The chap-
ter will cover the theories of information asymmetry, efficient market hypothesis, signalling and 
random walk, in the mentioned order. The chapter will end with a discussion of the relevance 
of the theories and the implications they might have on the insider trading environment.  
3.1 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry refers to a situation where one party in a transaction has more infor-
mation compared to the other. The person with more information could easily create a harmful 
situation by using his or her advantage. In most situations, it is the seller that possesses more 
information than the buyer but it can also be the other way around. Information asymmetry 
might lead to two types of problems; adverse selection and moral hazard. The most classical 
example defining adverse selection is George A. Akerlof’s article “The Market for Lemons” 
from 1970. One of the leading examples in the article depicts car owners who wish to sell their 
cars and naturally know more about that specific car than any possible buyer does. This leads 
to mistrust between the seller and the buyer followed by a bid from the buyer that reflects his 
negativity. When situations like this occur, sellers with good quality cars will not have any 
incentives to sell and a market with only bad quality cars will be created. This is an example of 
adverse selection. To conclude, the idea of information asymmetry is that different parties in a 
market have different levels of information (Akerlof 1970). 
3.2 Market efficiency hypothesis 
The second theory that is of relevance to this study is the hypothesis of efficient markets. Fama 
(1970) was the one who developed the Efficient Market Hypothesis and is known as the most 
famous researcher within the area of efficiency of financial markets and their constituents. 
However, previous to Fama developing his hypothesis, efficient markets were already being 
discussed under the name of Random Walk. The theory of Random Walk is a natural element 
of the study and will be elaborated further later on in the chapter. 
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Fama (1970) states in his hypothesis that it is not possible to systematically beat the market. 
This is because all information that is of relevance is already included in the current security 
prices and as a consequence, the market is therefore said to be efficient. According to Fama, 
efficiency of the market does however depend on the below mentioned conditions: 
 
 That trading securities should be costless 
 That all information should be available  
 That investors should act rationally 
 
The above-mentioned criterions are to some extent fulfilled in all markets but the question is 
rather to what degree of satisfaction they are fulfilled.  
However, Fama also points out that this is an extreme null hypothesis, which he does not expect 
to be literally true, although it lives up to it rather well. To be able to break down the hypothesis 
he uses three different sub formations:  
 
 Weak-form efficiency  
 Semi-strong-form efficiency 
 Strong-form efficiency 
 
The meaning of the different categories is to be able to define at what level the efficient market 
hypothesis is insufficient.  
 
Weak-form efficient market  
Weak-form efficiency is the first degree of the different levels in the efficient market hypothe-
sis, according to Fama (1970). The prices of securities in weak-form efficient markets are en-
tirely based on historical information, which means that prices only reflect historical events. 
Therefore, it is not possible to analyse historical data to predict future price settings. When tests 
supported the efficiency hypothesis model at this level the attention was turned to the second 
sub device called semi-strong-form efficiency, also stated by Fama (1970).  
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Semi-strong efficient market  
Fama (1970) states that the market is semi-strong if it can incorporate all the publicly available 
information, for example regarding announcements of stock splits, annual reports and new se-
curity issues. It assumes that the stocks can adapt quickly to new information. A rule of thumb 
whether the information is relevant or not is to determine if the stock price will be affected 
when the information is announced.  
 
Strong-form efficient market  
To fulfil the strong form of efficiency the stock prices have to reflect all information, meaning 
both public and private information, about a company. If this is fulfilled there is no possibility 
for the investors to obtain abnormal returns, including insiders with a lot of non-public infor-
mation. Fama (1970) reflects that the concern for this level is whether any investors or groups 
possess monopolistic access to information that is relevant for the establishment of the prices.   
3.3 Random walk hypothesis 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the random walk theory is consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis and it states that the stock market develop according to a random 
walk. Kendall (1953) was one of the earlier academics who studied the random walk hypothe-
sis. In his examination about the price movements he came to the conclusion that the move-
ments were very hard, almost impossible, to predict and that they could be described as a ran-
dom walk in prices.  
Fama discussed random walk in his 1970 article but his work started and was developed in his 
well-known article “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices”, published in 1965. In this article 
he came to the conclusion that it is not worth for investors to try to predict movements in the 
market if the hypothesis holds. Like in most theories, there is a crowd that not fully believes in 
the random walk theory. These professors, economists and investors have the faith that the 
market is predictable to some degree, meaning that prices move in trends and historical prices 
might be predicative in the sense that they foresee future prices. A professor believing in this 
angle of the theory is Andrew Lo who wrote the book “A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street” 
in 1999. Professor Lo states in his book that the random walk hypothesis might be false based 
on the assumptions presented above. Lo’s perspective is clearly supported by the title of his 
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book, a play on words with Malkiel’s “A Random Walk Down Wall Street”, written already in 
1973. Malkiel’s book took a more a supporting view of the random walk theory.  
3.4 Signalling hypothesis 
The theory of signalling can be located back to Spence (1973). He introduced and applied asym-
metric information in decision making models. In his work he illustrated how useful the signal-
ling theory is when optimizing solutions for signallers and for the ones receiving signals.  The 
signalling theory refers to the problems in information asymmetry in markets.  
John and Lang (1991) discuss insider holdings and points out that the best use of signals are 
when they are combined with other signals. John and Lang discuss the example that dividends 
can be good signals when they are combined with other market signals, for example combined 
with insider trading. Additionally, Del Brio and Miguel (2010), present that regarding infor-
mation content about dividends changes, there is a reaction in stock prices.  
According to Davies & Hillier (2008), there are several different ways of signalling. By adopt-
ing signalling, a company can both be perceived positively and negatively. Investigating divi-
dends and the size of the dividends, the market interprets positive signals about steady growth 
in the company if the dividends are increasing but if the dividends are decreasing the market 
perceives negative signals. Taking on more equity in a company might signal that the equity is 
overvalued and therefore sending negative signals. On the contrary, if a company takes on more 
debt it will send out positive signals.  
3.5 Discussion of the theoretical framework 
In this chapter, classical economic theories that are relevant for the study have been presented. 
The key concepts of the mentioned studies are certainly not new, but they form a foundation 
from which most research takes it point of departure. Practical examples of studies and the 
implications of the literature will be covered in the next chapter. One of the key concepts in the 
process of determining whether abnormal returns exist or not, and why abnormal returns occur, 
is the information asymmetry. When looking at this study’s different subsamples, a central as-
pect will be to what extent the availability of the firms’ information is available to the market 
and its participants. The degree of transparency will likely differ between different sized com-
panies and then naturally the level of information asymmetry. A likely step would therefore be 
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to discuss how efficient the market is. It will also be applicable for the different industry clas-
sifications and the phases of the business cycle.  
Fama’s efficient market hypothesis has, as presented above, different outcomes depending on 
the effectiveness of the market. Keep these different forms of market efficiency in mind as they 
will be discussed in combination with the results in chapter 6. Also, the information asymmetry 
theory is of relevance, as this conception will be tested in regards to the effectiveness of the 
market participants. 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Research 
In this chapter the reader will be able to get an understanding of previous empirical research 
of insider trading. The subject of insider trading has been around for approximately half a 
decade and only the most relevant articles for this study will be discussed. As with many several 
other fields of contemporary research, there is a distinct focus on studies conducted on the U.S. 
market. This study has adopted a Swedish framework and to depict the full picture, international 
studies will be discussed as well.  
4.1 U.S.-studies 
Jaffe (1974) was one of the first researchers who examined the possibility of earning an abnor-
mal return by mimicking insiders’ transactions. During the 1960’s and 1970’s all insiders were 
obliged to report their holdings and changes in their respective portfolio to the authorities. 
Twice a year the Official Report of Insider Holdings, containing all insider data, was released. 
Jaffe studied all transaction made by the insiders of the 200 largest companies of the Chicago 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) during the period 1962-1968. His main contribution to the 
field of insider trading was the introduction of a new tool of measuring insider trading. Jaffe 
manually checked the dataset and defined months during which trading activity took place. 
Hence, his final sample consisted of months with buying activity on one hand and month with 
selling activity on the other. By using CAPM1 as a model to predict the return of the market 
and running a regression on the sample, Jaffe concluded that insiders could earn abnormal re-
turns whereas outsiders imitating the insiders’ transaction would not profit by doing so. The 
only exception to where outsiders could earn an abnormal return was companies with what he 
defined as intensive trading, where the insider on average held the stock for up to 8 months. 8 
months was a shorter period of time than what insiders held their stocks for on average. The 
difficulties for outsiders to profit over the rest of the sample owes to the fact that transactions 
costs accounted for a larger sum than what was possible to yield from mimicking the insiders’ 
transactions. Notably, the results he obtained goes directly on the contrary to the hypothesis of 
the efficient market, since insiders were able to earn abnormal return.   
                                                 
1 CAPM is a widespread method of computing the return of a security or portfolio where the expected return equals 
the risk-free rate plus a risk premium. 
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Seyhun, who arguably is the most cited researcher within the field of insider trading, has pub-
lished two papers that stand out. In his first paper, which also happened to be his PhD disserta-
tion from 1986, Seyhun presented evidence that insiders possess an advantage against outsiders 
in terms of how well they can predict future returns. This result corresponded to Jaffe’s previous 
conclusions of insiders. Furthermore, what Seyhun did was that he identified different kinds of 
insiders, were he made a distinction between (1) Officers, (2) Directors, (3) Officer-directors, 
(4) Chairmen of board directors and (5) Large shareholders. By classifying insiders in subordi-
nate group based on their respective level of insight in the firm, Seyhun was able to test the 
hypothesis of information asymmetry. The data contained all insider transactions on the U.S. 
market between the years 1975-1981. The conclusion was the same as Jaffe had made. The 
obtained results confirmed his hypothesis that depending on the level of insight in the firm, the 
abnormal return varies. Higher ranked insiders (directors and officers) earned a significantly 
higher level of abnormal return than lower ranked insiders (officer-directors). In line with the 
hypothesis of different levels of information, Seyhun concluded that insiders tend to make 
larger transaction when they have an information advantage. However, when looking at outsid-
ers ability to mimic insider transactions, he concluded that transactions cost made it unprofita-
ble and hence, outsiders were not able to earn abnormal returns. 
In his 1988 study, Seyhun further developed his earlier hypothesis of insiders earning abnormal 
returns. He developed a framework where he tested if aggregate buying in the same stock by 
many different insiders equalled to a higher return than if only one purchase had been made. 
This is known as cluster transactions. He defined cluster transactions as months with more than 
3 transactions of the same kind (either purchases or sales) in the same stock made by different 
insiders. The result showed that the following sixty days – after the last of the aggregated pur-
chases had occurred - were characterized by a statistically significant rise in the stock’s price. 
The opposite hypothesis was also proven to hold, that is, aggregated sales in the stock were 
followed by an abnormal decline in the stock. Seyhun also investigated whether the overall 
market condition influenced the return of insiders. The results clearly indicated that insiders of 
smaller firms made stock transactions based on factors deriving from the specific firm and not 
the condition of the overall market. Also, the abnormal return stemming from insiders in smaller 
firms was constantly positive, independent of the overall market conditions.  
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001) studied insider trading in the context of how the market reacts to 
insider transactions. The sample consisted of all companies traded on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ and the sample period was 1975-1995. Their main conclusion was that the market 
movement stemming from insider transactions was on average very little. However, and more 
interesting, is the fact that they were able to determine that insiders had a contrarian approach 
to their investing on an aggregate level. This is in line with Seyhun’s inference. Furthermore, 
Lakonishok and Lee were able to determine that insiders in smaller firms were more actively 
trading the stock than insiders in larger companies. Lakonishok and Lee propose the solution 
that smaller firms tend to be less efficiently priced than larger firms, and hence a possibility to 
exploit the mispricing existed. Lakonishok and Lee further concluded that purchases made by 
insiders were informative in the sense that they predicted future returns. However, insider sales 
were proved not to be as strong in predicting future stock movement. 
 
Lin and Howe (1990) examined the profitability of insiders in firms traded on NASDAQ. They 
concluded that insiders closer to the firm (such as CEO) have more relevant information and 
more importantly, access to valuable information compared to insiders more remotely located 
to the firm (large shareholders). In their results they confirmed their hypothesis since CEOs 
earned a higher abnormal return. The link seemed to hold as more remote insider earned lower 
abnormal returns. One reason to this is that the CEO has an insight in the firm’s day-to-day 
operations that the large shareholder might lack. Ultimately, after taking transaction costs into 
account, Lin and Howe found evidence that the semi strong market hypothesis by Fama holds 
as outsiders are unable to earn abnormal return by imitating insiders’ transactions.  
 
Iqbal and Shetty (2002) conducted research with the aim to examine whether insider transac-
tions and stock returns have a relationship of causality at the firm level. They studied the years 
1988-1998. Due to the angle, they had the possibility to observe if the trading is related to firm-
specific information. The result showed, both on aggregate and firm level, a negative impact of 
stock returns on future insider transactions. The fact that the impact is negative is most likely 
because insiders purchase after the price decreases and sell after the price increases. Hence, 
insiders are prone to invest when the general view, and thereby the price, of the company is 
priced in a way that do not correspond with the insider’s personal view.   
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Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find strong evidence that insider purchases have a positive re-
lationship to future earnings. They present an idea of insiders being both contrarian investors, 
that is, they go against outsiders’ view of the value of the firm, as well as trading on future 
news. The latter indicates that a skewed information asymmetry exists, which proves why in-
siders are able to earn significant returns. Furthermore, Piotroski and Roulstone find a stronger 
relationship between insider purchases and stronger future earnings in smaller firms due to the 
lower degree of information available about these firms. In line with Seyhun (1988), Piotroski 
and Roulstone see a stronger relationship between executives and future earnings (rather than 
lower-ranked insiders and future earnings).  
4.2 International studies 
Pope, Morris and Peel. (1990) were able to conclude Seyhun’s (1986) proposal of insider earn-
ing abnormal return, but on London Stock Exchange. The study was the first of its kind outside 
of the U.S. and the obtained result confirmed Seyhun (1986) and Jaffe (1974) previous findings. 
The authors were able to conclude a significant size of firm effect. Insiders of larger firms were 
less prone to show any form of abnormal returns, whilst insiders of smaller firms achieved a 
statistically significant abnormal return.  
 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) conducted a study of insider trades performed on the Oslo Stock Ex-
change with time scope 1985-1992. They adopted a time-weighted model. The result turned out 
in a slightly different fashion than the previously presented studies. Eckbo and Smith were not 
able to prove any relationship between insider transactions and positive abnormal returns at all. 
Instead the result showed a somewhat negative return from insider transactions. In addition, 
they found that the portfolios formed from all insider transactions were outperformed by the 
portfolios handled by mutual funds on the same stock exchange.  
 
Del Brio and Miguel (2010) studied the Spanish stock market, but chose a somewhat different 
scope than most other studies. They focused on the signalling aspect of different kinds of ac-
tions, and what market reaction to expect. The signalling effect of insiders’ transactions was 
one. The reaction of insiders who sold their stocks turned out to be rather negative. This result 
comes quite intuitively, but when combining the signalling effect of insider sales with a shift 
downwards in the company’s dividend policy, the result showed much higher impact. The au-
thors thereby conclude that it is relevant to look for not only insider transaction, but also insider 
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transaction in combination with other corporate actions with signalling value. Also, the opposite 
relationship was studied. When insiders bought the stock, the market interpreted it as a positive 
signal and stock prices rose.    
 
Dickgaisser and Kaserer (2009) performed a study on the German stock market with the aim of 
looking further into the efficient market hypothesis. Their scope was to seek into whether or 
not outsiders would be able to imitate insiders’ transactions in order to earn abnormal returns. 
When looking at the reaction to the announcements of directors’ transactions they discover a 
large post-event excess return. However, the results show that outsiders’ possibility to earn 
abnormal return decreases and disappears as soon as transaction costs are taken into account. 
Therefore, the obtained results do not interfere with the efficient market hypothesis, which 
thereby is said to hold. They also show that the idiosyncratic risk makes it costly for outsiders 
to mimic the transaction and therefore poses a threat to the strategy. To sum up, the study pro-
vides evidence that stock prices reflect publicly available information in an efficient manner. 
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TABLE 4.1  SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
 
 
Authors 
Country of 
study 
Publication and 
Year 
Years studied 
Topic of Re-
search 
Main conclusion 
Jaffe United States 
Journal of Busi-
ness (1975) 
1962-1968 
Informational 
content of in-
sider trading. 
Insiders might earn abnormal returns, but out-
siders are hindered by transaction costs. 
Seyhun 
 
United States 
Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 
(1986) 
1975-1981 
The possibility 
of earning ab-
normal returns, 
both for insiders 
and outsiders. 
Insiders are able to obtain abnormal returns. 
More so if the insiders are higher ranked. 
Transactions costs prevent outsiders form earn-
ing abnormal returns. 
Seyhun 
 
United States 
Journal of Fi-
nance 
(1988) 
1975-1981 
Level of insight 
amongst differ-
ent kinds of in-
siders. 
Pattern showing that insiders with day to day 
engagement with firm earn higher return. Also 
strong correlation between cluster transactions 
and abnormal return during upcoming 60 days. 
Eckbo & Smith 
 
Norway 
Journal of Fi-
nance 
(1998) 
1985-1992 
Insiders’ ability 
to earn abnormal 
returns. 
Slightly negative correlation between insider 
purchases and stock return with regards to firm 
specific factors. 
Lakonishok & 
Lee 
United States 
Review of Finan-
cial Studies 
(2001) 
1975-1995 
Insider transac-
tions and market 
reaction. 
Insiders seem to be informative when studying 
purchases. Sales show no significant connection 
with regards to declining stock prices. 
Del Brio & Mi-
guel 
 
Spain 
European Finan-
cial Management 
(2010) 
1992-1996 
Signalling effect 
from corporate 
actions. 
Strong signalling effect from insider sales, 
which corresponds to negative stock return. 
The informational content of corporate actions 
such as dividend cuts and earnings announce-
ment plays a crucial part of predicting future 
stock movement. 
Lin & Howe 
 
United States 
Journal of Fi-
nance 
(1990) 
1975-1988 
Level of insight 
amongst differ-
ent kinds of in-
siders. 
Insiders (CEO) closer to the company have 
greater access to important information than 
those who are more remotely connected (large 
shareholders). 
Piotroski & 
Roulstone 
 
United States 
Journal of Ac-
counting & Eco-
nomics (2005) 
 
1995-2000 
Psychology be-
hind investment 
undertaken by 
insiders. 
Strong evidence between insider purchases and 
future earnings. Insiders tend to be contrarian 
investors. 
Pope, Morris & 
Peel 
 
United Kingdom 
Journal of Busi-
ness, Finance and 
Accounting 
(1990) 
 
1982-1988 
Abnormal return 
amongst insid-
ers. 
Insiders are able to earn abnormal return on 
London Stock Exchange. Larger firms tend to 
show a lower level of abnormal return than 
smaller firms. 
Dickgiesser & 
Kaserer 
Germany 
German Eco-
nomic Review 
(2010) 
 
2002-2007 
Outsiders’ ability 
to imitate insider 
transactions. 
Insiders (directors) are able to achieve abnormal 
return. Outsiders are not, largely owing to the 
fact that transactions costs eats up the profit. 
The efficient market hypothesis is said to hold. 
Iqbal & Shetty United States 
Journal of Eco-
nomics and Busi-
ness 
(2002) 
1990-2000 
Relationship be-
tween insider 
trading and stock 
returns. 
Insiders tend to buy and sell the stock based on 
personal views. Transactions often occur after a 
surge or plunge of the stock price. 
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4.3 Discussion of previous research 
As the field of insider trading is a vast topic and more than a handful papers have been written, 
only the ones the authors deem to be of most relevance has been discussed above. Table 4.1 
provides a quick overview and is intended to help the reader navigate between different studies. 
It further functions as a summation of the articles that has been reviewed in this chapter. 
Most of the above-mentioned studies, performed on various markets, have shown the same 
results, which are insiders earning abnormal returns by using their superior access to infor-
mation. These findings seem to be universal and not a result of country specific features. This 
is something that Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) amongst other have 
proved. However, when consideration of factors such as transaction costs and idiosyncratic risk 
have been taken into account, the results become somewhat mixed. Any practical impact of a 
study unequivocally includes these factors to conclude if outsiders are able to earn abnormal 
return by mimicking insiders.  
 
Eckbo and Smith’s (1998) research on Oslo Stock Exchange proves to be the only study where 
the originators were unable to provide evidence of abnormal return on behalf of insiders. In 
terms of how outsiders are able to imitate insiders’ transactions and by doing so earning abnor-
mal return, the results differ. Jaffe (1974) proved that outsiders would be able to earn abnormal 
return in companies with intensive trading, even after consideration of transaction costs was 
made. Seyhun (1986) found it impossible, as the transaction costs accounted for a too large 
portion. One obvious reason to the contradictory findings is the different time scope used, as 
well as the difference in the classification of companies.  
Dickgiesser and Kaserer’s (2009) results from the German market are in line with Seyhun’s 
findings, where they conclude that the efficient market hypothesis holds. 
 
An interesting aspect of literature on insider trading is how it has been proved that higher-
ranked insiders tend to earn a larger degree of abnormal return that lower-ranked. This finding 
is not seen as surprising since the CEO is indeed very well informed about projects undertaken 
by the company. Furthermore, a general feature that is constant throughout many studies is that 
the smaller the company the larger possible abnormal return. Several authors discuss this phe-
nomenon as the result of information asymmetry across the array of investors. This comes quite 
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intuitively as smaller firms are less well-known and are not covered in the same extent as larger 
companies generally are in terms of publicity.    
 
As many of the mentioned studies have been performed on the American market, the results 
cannot be said to be fully replicable to the Swedish settings. This is partly due to the different 
legal settings between countries and partly due to rules regarding the reporting duty of insider 
holdings. Arguably, one could raise concerns over the most frequently cited studies (Jaffe 1974 
and Seyhun 1986) as they are now stricken in years. However, this could also be seen as a 
strength since the results are still valid. 
 
Most of the relevant studies have adopted an event study approach, where only minor distinc-
tion are made between the different studies. It comes quite intuitive as the area of study has 
generally been the actual insider transaction, an event whose impact is easily measurable with 
the event study framework. Therefore, this study will consequently adopt the very same method 
of studying the event. A thorough dissection of the methodology used for this study will be 
covered in chapter 5. 
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 Chapter 5 Methodology  
The fifth chapter will present the reader to important methodological aspects of the study. 
The chapter will begin with an introduction to the field of a quantitative study and the deductive 
approach, then continuing with a thorough presentation of the data and its characteristics. 
Furthermore, a lot of space has been given to the identification of clusters. Following, the 
chapter will continue with a full cover of the event study framework, as it is the preferred 
method to examine cross sectional events. The chapter will end with a run-through of the test 
statistics and their appropriateness.  
 
5.1 Choice of scope 
There are two main categories investigated when deciding method for thesis writing; qualitative 
method and quantitative method. Backman (2008) describes the distinction between the two 
different methods. The qualitative method is an interpretive research strategy using words and 
observations rather than numbers and statistics. The latter is therefore closely related to the 
quantitative study framework. A quantitative study experiences a theory examination whereas 
a qualitative study undergoes a grounded theory. Since this study has a testing approach, it will 
have a deductive approach. With the orientation explained for this study, a quantitative study 
was relevant due to the focus on reliable data, statistical tests, event studies and the structured 
outline. Bryman and Bell (2003) depictures essential keywords within the field of quantitative 
studies that can be replicable on this study. The notions of specific factors, such as causality, 
replication and measurements are crucial and put aside the critique against quantitative frame-
works. The critique, also mentioned by Bryman and Bell (2003), concerns the fact that a scien-
tific model can study the social reality and scepticism is raised. To build a model within the 
field discussed in the study, a comprising of including signals from insider behaviour and ac-
tions, it requires involvement of a scientific model testing statistics.  
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S O U R C E :  B R Y M A N  &  B EL L  ( 2 0 0 3 )  
FIGURE 5.1   
THE DEDUCTIVE APPROA CH  
 
 
5.1.1. The deductive approach 
By adopting a deductive approach, the normal course of action consists of six steps where the 
first step evolves from existing literature within the area of interest. The existing literature func-
tions as a foundation from which the hypothesis is deduced. Based on existing theories within 
the field of study, one or several hypotheses are formulated. The third step is the process of 
gathering data needed to study the subject. Normally, a framework consisting of relevant test 
statistics is set up that aim at testing the deduced hypotheses. After having structured the model, 
the hypotheses will either be confirmed or rejected by the output of the model. Depending on 
the outcome, the previous theory might be subject to change after new findings have been 
deemed scientifically acceptable. 
 
  
Theory
Formulation 
of 
hypothesis
Data 
collection
Testing of 
the model
Rejecting or 
approval of 
hypothesis
Revision of 
theory
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5.2 Presentation of the study 
The following part of the chapter will present the sample included in the study, which methods 
used to identify clusters and end with a presentation of the three subsamples made to formulate 
the hypotheses. 
As previously mentioned, all insiders are obliged to report their holdings (as discussed in chap-
ter 3), to the record Swedish Financial Authority (Finansinspektionen: hereinafter referred to 
as FI). However, as this study focuses on the years 2005-2014, all insider transactions executed 
during the time period constitute the original data sample. During these 10 years, the total num-
ber of transactions made were 125 657. In other words, all of these transactions make up the 
total data sample. However, in the same fashion as Jaffe (1976) and Seyhun (1988), this study 
seeks only to investigate insider transactions that are the results of actual investment decisions 
made by the individual insider persons. Therefore only transactions made in the company stock 
are considered. Consequently, exercised stock convertibles, options, allocations or stocks re-
ceived through incentive programs are not included, as they are generally the result of factors 
not originating from active investment decisions. 
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Furthermore, Gregory et al. (1994) conclude that including incentive based transactions will 
lead to a reduced effect when measuring the abnormal return. Approximately 50 124 insider 
transactions remained after having filtered the total data sample. Out of the remaining 50 124 
transactions, 29 689 transactions consisted of insiders who purchased the stock and the remain-
ing 20 435 transactions were insiders who sold the stock. Not all companies have been listed 
for the full 10 years that the study is examining, which is a natural result of initial public offer-
ings on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Naturally, these companies are also included in the total 
sample. In accordance with this, delisted companies that for any reason were subject to delisting 
during the studied time period are also included. The main reason to include the delisted com-
panies is to avoid the survivorship bias, which is a form selection bias where only prosperous 
companies that were able to “survive” are included. On a separate note, this is normally a more 
serious problem when conducting a study with a longer time horizon. The total number of com-
panies included in the study equals 357, of which 60 are no longer listed. Figure 5.3 shows the 
total number of companies included. The observant reader might come to the conclusion that 
there are more shares included in this study than there are companies listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm. That is a valid point. However, the reason for this is that there is a difference be-
tween number of companies and number of shares listed on OMX NASDAQ Stockholm since 
some companies have both class A and class B shares listed. A complete list of all included 
companies can be seen in Appendix 2. Companies included in the study.  
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FIGURE 5.4 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSIDER 
TRANSACTIONS AND CLUSTERS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SOURCE: EK & ERLINDE R (2015)  
125 657 Insider Transaction
•The original sample consists of 125 
657 transactions, which equals the 
total number of transactions made by 
insiders on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm during 2005-2014 across 
all sorts of securities.
50 124  Stock Transactions
•Having filtered the original data for 
transactions made as a result of active 
investment decisions, that is, 
transaction made in the stock, 50 124 
transactions remained.  Out of this 
quantity, 29 689 transactions were 
purchases and 20 435 were sales.
2 659  Insider clusters
•Scanning all insider transactions for 
cluster formations lead to 2659 signals 
being found. These cluster formations 
are the foundation of this study and 
the topic of investigation. 
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5.3 Identifying cluster transactions  
In order to conduct an event study it is a necessity to identify the events the study aims to 
examine. The focus of this study is clusters, which are transactions executed by several insiders 
within a limited period of time. In order to facilitate for the reader, the following text will func-
tion as a manual of how a cluster is defined. In accordance with previous research (Seyhun and 
Sjöholm and Skoog), this study defines a cluster as being a predefined period of time when 
three or more insiders of the company either bought or sold the stock. Note that the transactions 
must be of the same kind in order for the transactions to be considered a cluster, that is, either 
three purchases or three sales. Seyhun (1988) applied and defined the cluster formation as three 
transactions in the same stock made within a month. However, this study restricts the time scoop 
to a week, which equals five days of trading (as no trading occurs during weekends per se). 
This approach is the same as Sjöholm and Skoog (2006) applied when studying cluster trans-
action of exchange traded stocks. What differentiates this study is the scoop of looking at out-
siders’ ability to earn abnormal return by imitating insiders, following the signal of clusters. 
Therefore, the actual event date of this study constitutes of the date when the information that 
a cluster formation has been completed is publicly released. 
Once again, this study is not limited to only buy transactions; it includes sale transactions as 
well.  
The clusters have been conducted from both Large-, Mid- and Small Cap-companies listed on 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Moreover, this has led to a larger sample to test from and due to the 
size of the sample the analyses will be subject to a more robust base from which the analyses 
are made. 
5.4 The execution date versus the release date 
Insiders are by law obliged to report any change in their holdings to FI within five days after 
the transaction was made. Thereafter, FI releases all insider transactions in the daily Insider 
Report, which is a publicly available report downloadable from FI and provided by several 
news feed agencies such as Cision and FinWire. During the years of 2005-2014, 125 657 insider 
transactions were made and reported by the FI. 
 
After having structured a model to identify cluster transaction, the total data sample was man-
ually checked. One cluster transaction renders one signal and each signal is considered as one 
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event. Note, that it is neither the first nor the second insider transaction that functions as the 
actual event, but the third. As the study aims exploring the possibilities for outsider to abnormal 
return, careful consideration has been taken to when the insider transactions were made public, 
as this will naturally function as the event day. Intuitively, any observant reader will understand 
that the release date will not be the same as the transaction date, i.e. the day when the third 
insider transaction took place, as there is a natural lag in the reporting. Once again, it is the 
release date of the third insider transaction date that constitutes the actual event, as this is the 
day when the market participants are made aware of the trading activity. 
 
5.4.1 Release of the daily insider register 
As has been pointed out earlier, FI keeps track of all insider transactions in Sweden. FI releases 
the Insider Report each weekday at 17:30, a time that has been moved from 14:30 which used 
to constitute the time when the list was released. The trading activity of NASDAQ OMX Stock-
holm closes at 17:30 which makes it impossible to trade on the information from the list since 
it is released when the stock market has closed. The information asymmetry between market 
participants has thus declined due to the change in policy. However, during the years investi-
gated in this study, 2005-2014, the insider register was released at 14:30 and therefore the mid 
prices of stocks for the day that the transactions were made public has been used in this study. 
If one would conduct the same study as this one but with a time scoop including 2015, it would 
be necessary to use the following days opening prices since that would be the first possible 
chance outsiders have to act on the information of insider transactions. The purpose of the study 
is to investigate outsiders’ possibility of achieving abnormal returns, hence the decision of using 
mid prices for the day the transactions are published is taken to further validate the results. 
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5.5 Subsamples 
After having studied earlier research and set up a couple of important criterions of what might 
be relevant to study three subsamples of the original sample of 2 659 insider clusters were made. 
The subsamples will be presented and discussed in detail below. Each of the different parts of 
the subsamples constitutes one portfolio, while purchases and sales portfolios for all subsamples 
are being studied at individual basis. The results from the subsamples are presented in chapter 
6. 
5.5.1 Subsample 1: Size of Firm 
The first subsample of the original sample constitutes of a subsample being made on the basis 
of the firms’ respective size. This division comes quite intuitive as previous research (Seyhun 
1986, Lakonishok and Lee 2001 and Wong, Chuk and Wu 2000) suggest that there exist a 
difference in the ability of earning abnormal return depending on firm size. Even though the 
focus of the mentioned studies is to see whether insiders are able to earn abnormal return and 
not outsiders, the findings present an interesting angle. It seems that large- and mid-sized com-
panies are subject to a higher level of analysis from outside stakeholder, such as analysts. As a 
consequence, the results do not show any clear sign of possibilities to earn abnormal return, 
something that the authors suggest is a consequence of non-existing access to superior infor-
mation amongst the insiders. However, smaller firms show a distinct difference and offer the 
opportunity to earn abnormal returns. Seyhun (1986) ascribes this possibility to a significantly 
higher degree of information asymmetry, and a natural cause of less attention being drawn to 
smaller companies from investors. En clair, insiders on average in smaller firms tend to hold a 
clear information advantage against the uninformed outside investor. To what extent might 
these findings be applicable on firms traded on OMX Stockholm? This study applies a subsam-
ple of the firms included, depending on their respective size. Simply by using NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm’s three different lists, the Large-, Mid- and Small Cap lists, the division is made. 
However, there are a couple of underlying factors that the reader should be aware of. Firstly, 
the Large-, Mid- and Small cap lists were introduced during October 2006. Up to that date, the 
A-list, O-list and Attract 40-list had been used. However as this study examines companies and 
transactions that were made during 2005-2014 and consequently have data observations from 
the years when the previous classification was still in use, the natural choice has been to include 
the companies on the respective list where they were introduced following the new classifica-
tion in October 2006. Secondly, all companies that have been delisted, are incorporated in the 
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study on the lists were they most recently traded prior to the delisting. Thirdly, and perhaps 
more important, several firms have changed lists during the 10 years between January 1st 2005 
and December 31st 2014. The lists are being revised every year at year-end and firms that do 
not meet the minimum threshold in terms of market capitalization are subject to either a down-
grade or upgrade in terms of listing (Nasdaq OMX Stockholm). The practical implications of 
this revisions to this study is that a firm might have been a component of the Small Cap list at 
one point in time and at a later stage a part of the Mid Cap list. This is simply an example to 
illustrate the importance of classifying the companies correctly. The authors have decided to 
look at every single event separately and classify the event according to what list the firm be-
longed to during that specific date. Both purchases and sales will be included, however there 
will be a separation between the two in terms of portfolio belonging. The reason for the sepa-
ration between purchases and sales is to determine what type of transaction show the highest 
level of signalling value. 
Based on the arguments listed above, subsample 1 while henceforth be: 
 
Large Cap: Firms with a market capitalization of €1.000.000.000 or above 
Mid Cap:  Firms with a market capitalization between €1.000.000.000 - €150.000.000 
Small Cap: Firms with a market capitalization below €150.000.000 
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5.5.2 Subsample 2: Industry classification 
The second subsample of this study is a subsample of the included companies based on their 
respective industry classification. Cheauk, Fan and So (2005) investigated insider activity on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange during1993-1998 in terms of different industry classifications. 
They studied both purchases and sales and concluded that insiders across all industries proved 
to be successful regarding their ability to earn abnormal return. However there was a clear dis-
tinction between different industries. Insiders of financial companies were the most successful, 
earning on average an abnormal return of 2,8% during the 20 days that followed the transaction, 
while insider belonging to the group Hotels showed almost no signs of abnormal returns. An 
interesting inference by Cheauk et al. is that insider sales turned out to a more powerful signal 
than purchases, something that the authors ascribed to insiders constantly timing their sales at 
high prices. The implication of this might be that certain industries are characterized by a higher 
level of information asymmetry. While Cheauk et al.’s results are not applicable to Swedish 
settings, the underlying idea of studying different industries is well-founded. 
 
The subsample of the companies in this study will be based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (hereinafter referred to as ICB). ICB is a global classification standard that most 
stock exchanges throughout the world have adopted. Originally, the taxonomy was launched 
by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2005 and the underlying idea is to simplify the comparison of 
companies, active within the same field. All companies on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm are 
divided into 10 industry groups based on their respective core business (ICB Benchmark Indus-
try Structure and Definitions). Table 5.1 shows the total number of companies within each of 
the groups and the groups’ percentage of all companies. As can be seen, NASDAQ OMX Stock-
holm is dominated by Industrials, a group that make up roughly one fourth of all companies. 
Also, Financials and Technology companies are large, while there are only two companies 
across all lists that belong to Utilities.  
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As the different groups are regressed on individual basis, different indices are used to compute 
the CAAR for each group. Please note that only nine groups are present in this study, as the 10th 
group, Utilities and its constituents did not provide any cluster formations during the studied 
time period.  The distribution of clusters will be discussed further in section 6.1 of chapter 6.  
Figure 5.5 on the next page show how the different industry segments have developed during 
the years included in this study. It becomes evident that there has been a clear difference in 
terms of how well the different groups have performed on an aggregated level, that is, all the 
components of the different groups together. 
Group Number of companies Percentage of total number of 
companies 
Financials 56 17,55% 
Technology 56 17.55% 
Basic Materials 22 6,89% 
Consumer Services 26 8,14% 
Oil & Gas 8 2,49% 
Industrials 77 24,13% 
Utilities 2 0,62% 
Consumer Goods 31 9.80% 
Health Care 34 10,65% 
Telecom 7 2,18% 
Total 319 companies 100% 
TABLE 5.1  COMPANIES PER INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
S O U R C E :  N A S D A Q OM X  S T O C K H O L M ,  I C B  
0-1 
0-2 
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The second subsample of the sample will consequently be divided based on the above men-
tioned ICB industry classification and include the following groups: 
 
- Financials 
- Telecom 
- Basic Materials 
- Consumer Services 
- Industrials 
- Technology 
- Consumer Goods 
- Oil & Gas 
- Health Care 
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5.5.3 Subsample 3: Phase of business cycle  
Previous studies of insider trading have shown that insiders’ trading activity follow the patterns 
of traditional business cycles. Also, insiders tend to time their transaction quite well, leading to 
higher return than what an uninformed investor might achieve. This hypothesis was tested by 
Lakonishok & Lee (2001), who showed that insiders were very heavy sellers the month preced-
ing the Black Monday in 19872 and thus managed to realize profits from stock holdings. Abu-
mustafa and Nusair (2011) studied how the activity amongst insider differs depending on the 
general climate of the market, that is, times of growth and expansion or times of contraction 
and recession. The general conclusion that they were able to draw was that insider sales in-
creased substantially in times of poor performance of the economy as a whole (most notably 
the months after September 2007 which officially marks the start of the latest financial crisis). 
The informativeness of sales were thus a stronger signal in times of recession. 
The companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm are obviously of Swedish origin, but as 
Sweden as a whole is a very export oriented country the companies are dependent on how the 
global economy develops. Figure 6.5 shows how the GDP of Sweden, the EU-15 countries (the 
15 members of the European Union prior to the accession in 2004)3 and the OECD countries 
have developed between 2005 and 2014. By looking at the graph, it becomes evident that the 
Swedish economy has performed better than the OECD countries on average and much better 
than the EU-15 countries. A business cycle is generally divided into phases of expansion and 
phases of contraction and when classifying the years between 2005 and 2014 the authors of this 
study have chosen to compile an average of: 1. The GDP of Sweden, 2. The GDP of the EU-15 
countries and 3.the GDP of the OECD countries. By doing so, 6 years and 6 months were clas-
sified as years of expansion and 3 years and 6 months years were classified as years of contrac-
tion. Table 5.2 on the next page further clarifies which years and quarters of a year that are 
classified as either expansion or recession. 
  
                                                 
2 Black Monday refers to the 19th October when stock markets across the world crashed and substantial value was 
erased in the matter of hours (Browning 2007) 
3 The EU-15 countries include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden & United Kingdom (OECD: Glossary of Statistical Terms) 
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Phase of business cycle Years and Quarters Total 
Expansion 
2005, 2006, 2007 (Q1&Q2), 2009 
(Q3&Q4), 2010, 2012 (Q3&Q4), 
2013 & 2014 
6 years 6 month 
Recession 
2007 (Q3&Q4), 2008, 2009 
(Q1&Q2), 2011, 2012 & (Q1&Q2) 
3 years 6 month 
 
The third subsample of the data sample will be a subsample defined of what stage of the busi-
ness cycle the insider transactions and the cluster formations were made. The subsample will 
be based on the arguments outlined on the previous page on consist of the following two groups: 
 
- Transactions made during years of Expansion 
- Transactions made during years of Recession 
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TABLE  5 .2   
DEFINITION  OF  S UB SA M PLE  3 :  PHASE  O F  BUSI NES S  CY CLE  
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5.6 Formulation of hypotheses 
The hypotheses below is intended to conclude the discussion given over the last pages. The aim 
of this study is to investigate whether outsiders are able to earn abnormal return by imitating 
cluster formations or not. The sample has been separated into three subsamples, as presented in 
sections 5.5.1-5.5.2. The hypothesis is the same in each subsample. As customary in all re-
search, the null hypothesis attempts to capture that no significant variation exists in the sample. 
 
The hypothesis will thus be:  
H0 : Outsiders are not able to earn abnormal return by imitating cluster formation, formed from 
insider transactions. 
H1 : Outsiders are able to earn abnormal return by imitating cluster formations, formed from 
insider transactions. 
5.7 The process of gathering and organizing data 
5.7.1. Insider- and stock data 
All insider transactions have been subtracted from Millistream, a software product developed 
by the financial data provider Millistream Market Data AB. Millistream automatically extracts 
all data from the Swedish Financial Authority's Register of insider transactions, which is a 
publicly available database with all insider transactions saved. As part of the collaboration be-
tween the authors of the study and Redeye (read appendix 3 for more information of the col-
laboration), the authors have been able to retrieve the data concerning all insider transactions 
from Millistream, albeit it being a service exclusively provided to financial institutions. The 
data concerning stock and index prices have been gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream, 
a reliable provider of stock quotes and financial news. The retrieved data from Thomson Reu-
ters Datastream constitute of daily stock quotes of all included stocks, both companies that are 
currently listed on either of Large-, Mid-, or Small cap of NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and 
companies that have been delisted during the period. It is of importance to stress that the delisted 
companies, 60 in numbers, makes the total sample less vulnerable to survivorship bias. The 
survivorship bias constitutes an important risk as only including successful companies that have 
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managed to survive for the studied 10 years would lead to a systematic error. Hence why, com-
panies that for various reasons have not been listed for the whole period are included as well. 
In practice, this means that some companies have disappeared and yet some have been listed at 
a later stage and as a consequence, have not been included for the whole period of 10 years. 
Also, the data regarding index prices has been retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
5.7.2. Discussion and general critique of the data collection 
The data regarding insider transactions that have been processed in this study’s tests have been 
collected from Millistream. Millistream is a highly considered feed provider of financial data, 
and albeit the data being of secondary source, the level of reliability should be high. However, 
crosschecks of the samples have naturally been made by the authors to authenticate the data. In 
doing so, the insider transactions received from Millistream have been checked against the data 
provided from FI, the primary source of insider data. While going through the sample, no mis-
leading information was found. All stock prices have been downloaded from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, with access kindly provided by the School of Economics and Management. In the 
case of daily stock prices, the verification of the data to discover potential sources of errors is 
difficult. However, the data has been checked against NASDAQ OMX Stockholm’s database 
containing all historical prices of the traded assets included in this study. This crosscheck was 
performed manually and the original data from Datastream did not show any sign of errors or 
missing values.  
5.7.3 Discussion of the use of stock prices 
The stock prices that are used throughout this study are daily adjusted prices, meaning that 
intraday movement is not included. Intuitively the price might not be the best price that the 
outsider will be able to buy or sell the stock at, as stock prices always fluctuate during a trading 
day and not seldom trade at a both higher and lower price compared to the last price of the day. 
However, important events such as stock splits and dividends are incorporated in the prices. 
Also, as this study focuses on outsiders’ ability to earn abnormal return, the mid-price of all 
stock quotes has been used throughout the entire study.   
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5.7.4 Organization of the data 
As much of the organization of the data has been done manually, that is, manually scanning the 
more than 100 000 insider transaction made during 2005-2014, the process is inevitably vul-
nerable to human errors. Naturally, several measures of precautions have been taken to mini-
mize any kinds of misclassifications resulting from errors. However, as the data has been cross-
checked several times to spot mistakes, the possible sources of errors are at a level that is 
deemed to be of acceptable standard and not influencing the results.  
 
5.8 Literature 
As the first step of the deductive approach when conducting a study of this kind is to examine 
previous literature, much attention has been paid to carefully review previous studies and aca-
demic papers. Most articles have been retrieved by searches in either of Scopus or Libhub. The 
authors have sought to use reliable sources and esteemed academic journals, for example Jour-
nal of Finance and Journal of Financial Economics.  
5.8.1 Possible sources of biases  
Both the authors behind this study are students at the School of Economics and Management in 
Lund and as consequence of the similarities surrounding their respective backgrounds the study 
rests upon the foundation of how the authors are able to critically select and examine literature. 
Much focus has been on reviewing previous literature within the field of insider trading and 
building a framework from which this study’s position in existing research has found its place.  
5.9 Transaction costs: 
Transaction costs are the costs that arise when stocks are bought and sold on the stock exchange. 
As a topic of research, transaction costs have been investigated since the middle of the last 
century. Already in 1968, Demsetz presented a study focusing on transaction costs, his study 
becoming one of the more famous ones in the area. According to Demsetz, transaction costs 
can be defined as expenses incurred when securities are bought or sold, meaning a cost ex-
changing ownership titles. The definition transaction costs include both commission fees and 
bid-ask spreads. Looking at the bid-ask spreads, Demsetz highlights the need for the seller to 
be compensated for providing immediacy on the stock market to the buyers, that is the spread 
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between ask and bid prices. Additionally, he argues that transaction costs are lower when there 
is a large amount of shareholders which leads to the conclusion that the bid-ask spread should 
to be lower in larger firms than the smaller ones. Mcinish and Wood (1992) conclude a number 
of variables that are determinants of bid-ask spreads. These variables include averaged number 
of shares traded, the volume and the number of transactions. Furthermore, Mcinish and Wood 
propose the use of mid-values, which is an average between bid and ask quotes, when conduct-
ing studies such as this one. However, the second component of the conception transaction cost 
is the commission that brokers charge customers when executing transaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above presents the commission that a set of brokers charge their customers. As can 
be seen, the commission normally consists of two parts, first part being a flexible quote depend-
ing on the total size of the transaction. The average floating commission runs up to a total of 
0,087% of the total value of the transaction. The right hand column summarizes the set mini-
mum commission that brokers charge per transaction. This minimum commission is independ-
ent of the size of the transaction and functions as a floor in terms of how much the broker 
Brokerage Firm Commission Fee Minimum Commission 
Aktieinvest 0,055-0,130% 39-99 SEK 
Avanza 0,034-0,250% 0-99 SEK 
Danske Bank 0,10% 79 SEK 
Handelsbanken 0,09% 99 SEK 
Länsförsäkringar 0,09% 99 SEK 
Mangold 0,035-0,150% 49-99 SEK 
Nordea 0,00% 59-99 SEK 
Nordnet 0,034-0,150% 39-99 SEK 
Nordnetdirekt 0,15% 7 SEK 
SEB 0,09% 69 SEK 
Skandiabanken 0,044-0,250% 8-75 SEK 
Swedbank 0,030-0,090% 59-99 SEK 
Average 0,087% 68,40 SEK 
S O U R C E :  F I N A N S PO R TA L E N  
TABLE 5.3  COMMISSION FEES SWEDISH BROKERS 
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charges its customers. The first thing that becomes evident when looking at the table above is 
the differentials amongst the different brokers. Therefore, to include commission fees in the 
model would not show the true cost for the investor as this cost differs substantially depending 
on the broker and also on the frequency of the activity of the investor. Active investors tend to 
have more advantageous terms and hence lower commissions. (Avanza)    
Therefore, the incorporation of transaction costs in this study is limited to the use of mid-values 
of stock prices when conducting the tests. 
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5.10 Event studies 
The following section of the chapter will go over the event study framework which is the 
method of choice when measuring the impact of one or several events, as is the case in this 
study. The general outlines of event studies dates back to the 1930s, however this study will 
follow the guidelines outlined by MacKinlay in “Event Studies in Economics and Finance” 
(1997). 
Conducting an event study involves gathering financial market data and is well known in fi-
nance theory and often associated with mergers and acquisitions and issuing new debt or equity. 
However, according to MacKinlay, event studies have also been used in terms of legal cases 
investigating the impact on firm value when the regulatory environment has changed. The cen-
tral part of conducting an event study is the measurement of an abnormal stock return. Abnor-
mal returns are defined as the difference between the actual return and the expected normal 
return as stated by a model calculating a normal return.  
Event studies possess a long history and one of the first to examine the subject was Dolley in 
1933. He analysed the price effects of stock splits by studying the nominal price changes when 
the split occurred. MacKinlay (1997) describes seven different steps necessary when conduct-
ing an event study. All of the seven steps will be described and discussed over the next pages 
with regards to the respective steps’ implication in this study. 
 
1. Event definition 
2. Determine selection criteria 
3. Abnormal and normal returns 
4. Definition of estimation window 
5. Definition of testing framework 
6. Presentation of empirical results 
7. Interpretation and conclusions 
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Event definition 
According to MacKinlay’s (1997) seven-step model, the initial task is to exactly define the 
event that is of interest. In most event studies, the event consists of a date, but sometimes a 
month or hour is chosen. This study will adapt the conventional method of using specific dates 
as events. An interesting factor to take into consideration in this study is the importance of 
choosing the correct dates as events. The discussion of what dates constitute the event dates in 
this study was given in section 5.4. 
 
Choosing an event window can result in both a short period and a long period timeline. The 
study has investigated both options for different reasons. Kothari and Warner (2004) suggest 
that the event window should not be longer than 10 days or the power of the model might 
decrease. Also, previous research (Dickgiesser and Kaserer 2010) have shown that outsiders’ 
possibilities to earn abnormal return diminish quite quickly after the signals (that is the infor-
mation of insiders’ transactions) have gone public. Consquently, this study will adopt the use 
of multiple event windows, ending 1, 2, 5, 8 and 10 days respectively after the event date. 
 
Determine selection criteria  
This study investigates Large, Mid and Small Cap-companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stock-
holm. The sample data covers all trading days between January 1st and December 31st between 
the years 2005 and 2014. When the first outline to the study was written, a limitation to only 
include the Small- and Mid Cap-companies was originally decided. However, in order to 
broaden the sample and to be able to test the hypothesis of smaller firms showing larger possi-
bilities to earn abnormal return by imitating insiders, it became evident that Large Cap-compa-
nies also should be part of the total sample. 
 
Abnormal- and normal return 
The abnormal return is the difference between the realized return of the stock and the expected 
return of the stock if the event would not have taken place. The idea is to isolate the effect from 
the specific event from general movement not originating from the event that is the focus of the 
study. In order to be able to determine the abnormal return of the stocks after the insider cluster 
has been formed, one has to incorporate the expected return of the market. Hence, MacKinlay 
(1997) proposes the use of either the constant mean return-model or the market model. While 
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the former assumes a constant return of the market over time, the latter attaches great im-
portance to a linear relationship between the return of the market and return of the individual 
stocks. Furthermore, an important feature of the market model to keep in mind is the constant 
betas used throughout the event window.  
 
Estimation window 
The estimation window is the period of time that elapses up to the first day of the event window. 
When calculating abnormal return with the market model, the estimation window functions as 
a time frame during which the parameters for the stocks the study seek to investigate is calcu-
lated. Wells (2004), state that the time length of the estimation window should be long enough 
to assess the normal price action pattern of the studied securities. Most event studies adopt the 
use of an estimation window of between 120 – 180 days. MacKinley (1997) suggests that 120 
days is the minimum amount of trading days necessary to include in order to be able to calculate 
a fair value of the normal stock movement. Thus, this study will use 130 trading days as esti-
mation window. 
 
Testing framework 
The fifth step in an event study, according to MacKinlay (1997), is to test the framework for 
the abnormal returns. It is of great importance to consider and fully determine the null hypoth-
esis. This study has three sub hypotheses that will be tested independent of each other. The 
three subsamples are covered in section 5.5. 
 
Presentation of empirical results  
MacKinlay (1997) stresses that empirical results might be influenced by one or two firms and 
hence lead to a skewness of the results. However, the amount of firms is rather big in this event 
study. Therefore, it should not be of importance or a problem for this study. The results from 
this study will be presented in chapter 6. 
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Interpretations and conclusions  
In an ideal event study, an understanding of the sources will follow the empirical results and 
consequences of the effects in the event study. In terms of concluding the study, it is therefore 
important to interpret and to discuss the results obtained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.11 Critique against the use of the event study approach 
Albeit event studies being the common approach when studying a specific event’s impact on 
stock quotes et cetera, there are several concerns that need to be raised. Firstly, a longer event 
window makes the results more vulnerable to noise caused by other factors than the studied 
event, which in this case are the clusters transactions. Several authors have investigated this; 
amongst others Armitage & Barry (1994) who conclude that longer event windows lead to mis-
interpretations as external factors, not caused by the observed phenomenon, tends to influence 
the obtained conclusions. More so, they propose a maximum of 30 days as event window in 
order to avoid the mentioned bias. This is in line with previous research conducted by Fama 
(1996) who stress the fact that when measuring abnormal returns, the methodological frame-
work is dependent on the studied period. When measuring abnormal returns for a longer period 
of time, model specifications differ with regards to when measuring abnormal returns for 
shorter periods. A more common approach used when studying an event’s impact for a longer 
Event date 
T=0 T0=-131 T1=-1 
Estimation Window Post-event Window 
 
Event Window 
 
T2=+10 T3=+10 
S O U R C E :  M A C K IN L E Y  (1 9 9 7 )  
FIGURE 5.7  OUTLINE OF EVENT STUDY 
I N S I D E R  T R A D I N G  A N D  A B N O R M A L  R E T U R N  O N  T H E  S W E D I S H  S T O C K  M A R K E T  
46 
 
time horizon is the Buy-and-Hold strategy. However, as the longest event window chosen in 
this study is 10 days, the buy-and-hold strategy is not germane to the study and will not be 
discussed further.  
 
5.12 Sample period 
As previously presented, the time period for this study will be the 10 years beginning January 
1st and ending December 31st, thus including all insider transaction undertaken during any of 
the included 2520 days of trading. The choice to use a 10-year study window was made to 
broaden the credibility of the results as well as giving the authors further opportunities to study 
the sample in detail. It also opens up for a subsample of transactions made during the different 
phases of a full business cycle. This subsample is one of three that this study seeks to investigate 
and is further presented in section 5.3.3. Category 3 Phases of Business Cycle.  
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5.13 Indices used to calculate the normal return 
As this is study has split the main sample into three subsamples in order to study the sample at 
a more detailed level, different indices have been used to calculate the normal return of the 
stocks. This has been done in order to further increase the level of accuracy of the models. 
 
Subsample 1: Firm Size 
The first subsample seeks to shed light on the opportunity for outsiders to earn abnormal return 
across portfolios based on firm size, as measured by market capitalization. When testing the 
different portfolios the index used in the market model differs according to what portfolio being 
tested. Table 5.3 below shows what indexes are used for what portfolio.  
 
TABLE 5 . 4  INDE XES FOR SU BS AMPL E 1 :  F IRM SIZE   
  
 
 
Portfolio 
Index used in the mar-
ket model 
Constituents of the index 
OMX Large 
Cap 
OMXS30 
Market weighted share index consisting of the 30 most actively 
traded shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
OMX Mid 
Cap 
OMXSMCPI 
Index consisting of all companies listed on OMX Stockholm’s Mid 
Cap segment, currently 96 shares. 
OMX Small 
Cap 
OMXSSCPI 
Index consisting of all companies listed on OMX Stockholm’s Small 
Cap segment, currently 107 shares. 
S O U R C E :  N A S D AQ  OM X  S T O CK H O LM  
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Subsample 2: Industry Classification  
As previously described in section 5.5.2, the second subsample is based on the ICB classifica-
tion standard and divides the total sample into groups depending on the companies’ core busi-
ness. Table 5.4 below presents the different indices used when calculating the cumulative ab-
normal return for each portfolio in subsample 2. As can be seen in the right column, the com-
ponents of the different indices differ quite substantially in terms of the number of constituents. 
Please note that there is 10 groups according to the ICB classification standard, however one of 
the groups (Utilities) include companies that did not show any cluster formations during the 
studied period and is henceforth disregarded in this study. 
 
TABLE 5 . 5  INDE XES FOR SU BS AMPL E 2 :  I NDUS TRY CLA SSI FI CATI O N  
Group Market model used for each group Constituents of the index 
Financials OMX Stockholm Financials PI 
56 financial companies are currently in-
cluded in the group. 
Technology OMX Stockholm Technology PI 
56 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Health Care OMX Stockholm Health Care PI 
34 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Consumer Services OMX Stockholm Consumer Services PI 
26 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Consumer Goods OMX Stockholm Consumer Goods PI 
31 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Telecommunications OMX Stockholm Telecommunications PI 
7 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Basic Materials OMX Stockholm Basic Materials PI 
22 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Oil & Gas OMX Stockholm Oil & Gas PI 
8 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
Industrials OMX Stockholm Industrials PI 
77 companies are currently included in 
the group. 
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Subsample 3: Phase of Business Cycle 
For the third subsample, which has been discussed in section 5.5.3, the index used in the market 
model has been an index that includes all stocks on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The reason 
for this is that when conducting the statistical tests for the portfolios (transaction made during 
expansion years respective transactions made during years of recession) all companies, with no 
regards to firm size, are included. To prove the robustness of the market model and to avoid 
consequence of misspecification in the model, the study computes the third subsample with 
both AFGX4 and OMXSPI5. 
  
                                                 
4 Sweden’s oldest index, formed in 1937. The index consists of 192 shares from NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and 
is weighted according its constituents market capitalization. (Affärsvärlden)  
5 Index containing all shares trading on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The index is market weighted. (Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm) 
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5.14 Equations used to determine relevant test statistics 
The following section of the fifth chapter will cover all relevant statistical tests that have been 
conducted. The equations for each test are explained in order to facilitate the understanding of 
somewhat difficult formulas. 
 
5.14.1 Simple Net Returns 
For all events that the study seeks to investigate, the event study framework suggests that one 
should calculate the simple net returns of every single event. The return, R, of firm i at time 𝜏 
is calculated by the following equation: 
 
 
 
 
5.14.2 Logarithmical Returns 
However, as a short-term approach to the event study is used, MacKinley (1997) provides rea-
son as to why the logarithmical returns is more appropriate to use than simple net returns. En 
clare, the main reason that MacKinley gives is it that using logarithmical returns is more pref-
erable when conducting event studies with shorter time horizons, because the returns are less 
prone to be effected by skewness. Logarithmical returns are the same as continuously com-
pounded returns and are calculated with the following formula:  
 
 
 
 
 
5.14.3 Calculating abnormal returns 
After the returns of the single events have been determined, the next step is to calculate the 
abnormal return, which is the return that originates from the studied event. The goal is to see 
what impact the actual event has on the stock price and to understand to what extent the stock’s 
movement is just a cause of natural market movement. The abnormal return should therefore 
S O U R C E :  M A C K IN L E Y  (1 9 9 7 )  
S O U R C E :  M A C K IN L E Y  (1 9 9 7 )  
EQUATION 5.1 SIMPLE NET RETURN 
EQUATION 5.2 LOGARITHMICAL NET RETURN  
CHA PTE R  5  ME THOD OLOGY  
51 
 
be interpreted as the isolated effect of the event and the corresponding stock movement at time 
τ. The logic behind the calculation of the abnormal return is to subtract the expected return 
given the absence of the event from the actual return. The following equation is used to calculate 
the abnormal return: 
 
 
 
 
 
5.14.4 Cumulative abnormal return 
The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of all singe abnormal returns as calculated above. 
This is done in order to capture the combined impact of all events across the sample. As previ-
ously discussed, this study has adapted 5 different time length of event windows and conse-
quently 5 separate CARs have been calculated. Also, CAR’s for all different portfolios (groups 
of subsamples) are calculated. The test statistic is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
5.14.5 Cumulative average abnormal return 
The cumulative abnormal return is the cross-sectional average of each of all the CAR’s for the 
different event windows. This measure is of great importance of the result as all statistical tests 
that are conducted, are based on the CAAR measure (see next section of this chapter for a 
description of the relevant tests). CAAR is calculated with the following equation:  
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S O U R C E :  M A C K IN L E Y  (1 9 9 7 )  
S O U R C E :  M A C K IN L E Y  (1 9 9 7 )  
EQUATION 5.5 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN 
EQUATION 5.4 CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN 
EQUATION 5.3 ABNORMAL RETURN 
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5.15 Statistical tests 
The following part of the chapter will provide the reader with information what tests that have 
been conducted. There are several different statistical tests to choose from when examining the 
data. The factors to take into consideration when choosing relevant tests are based on the char-
acteristics of the data and what one wishes to study (Bryman and Bell 2003). This study presents 
mainly three different tests; Student’s t-test, Corrado’s Rank test and Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen’s t-test (hereinafter referred to as Boehmer et al.). The uncertainty about normal distri-
bution in the different samples reinforces the purpose of conducting more than one test. In order 
to make sure the interpretations of the results rests upon solid foundations, a normality test has 
been conducted on all subsamples. The normality test explores the distribution of the variable 
of interest and will provide invaluable insight into which statistical tests is relevant for each 
subsample. The normality test of choice of this study is the Shapiro-Wilk test, which will be 
discussed further in section 5.14.6. 
5.15.1 The meaning of cross-sectional tests and analyses  
A cross-sectional analysis, made by an investor, analyst or portfolio manager, focus on a com-
parison between a company and the industry it operates in or its industry peers. When imple-
menting a cross-sectional analysis, the aim could be to identify the company’s value, competi-
tors or the operational efficiency. In the end there is a hope and aim to make the best investment 
or to know how to further develop a company using the different comparison metrics provided. 
When analyses contain cross-sectional data, meaning that it is a type of data collected observing 
several different objects, for example firms, at the same period of time or with no regard to 
differences in time.  (Eventstudytools). 
The above definition of cross-sectional tests and analyses can easily be applied on this study’s 
material. Observing several cluster formations within different industries is a typical example 
of cross-sectional data. To be able to consider all of the provided data, it is necessary to use a 
tool functional and robust enough.  
5.15.2 Significance tests 
Hypothesis tests are normally divided into two different group; parametric and non-parametric. 
The parametric tests are recognized with normal distribution, homogenous variance and the 
mean used as a central measurement (Körner and Wahlgren 2006). In a non-parametric test, the 
distribution and variance can be any and instead of the mean used as a measurement the median 
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is more commonly used. In research in general and this study in particular, a parametric test is 
often followed by a non-parametric test to support the findings and to rule out that the results 
are due to outliers. (Eventstudytools).  
5.15.3 Student’s t-test 
Student t-test, also known as only the t-test, is a well-known and common parametric hypothesis 
test used to measure the significance in materials. It requires the observations to follow a normal 
distributed path and that is also the most important assumption. The t-test relies on a hypothesis 
and the aim is to test if the null hypothesis is supported and further on if two sets of data are 
significantly different from each other. If it not is normally distributed, the test becomes unre-
liable and the answers have to be found elsewhere (Körner and Wahlgren 2006).  
Due to the basics of the t-test and its use across the academia, it was a natural choice for the 
authors to include the test when searching for relevant tests. The student’s t-test will function 
as a base from the hypotheses are tested, if the sample meets the assumptions of normal distri-
bution that is. The test statistic for the Student’s t-test when for H0: CAAR = 0 is given by:  
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5.15.4 Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen’s standardized cross-sectional t-test 
To solve the problem where data becomes too affected by the event-induced volatility changes, 
Boehmer et al. introduced a robust standardized cross-sectional t-test in 1991. Boehmer et al. 
tests for the null hypothesis that the cumulative average abnormal return is equal to zero. 
Boehmer et al. found that when even the smallest increase in volatility in prices surrounding 
the event day occurs, most common methods reject the null hypothesis of non-abnormal returns. 
As a solution to this problem, they proposed that the variance of average abnormal return should 
be estimated from the cross-section of the event date prediction error. However, in the case of 
lower-tailed hypothesis, the test rejects the null hypothesis too often.   
 
For the same reason as Boehmer et al. created the test, this study will include the test in order 
to further enhance the possibilities to deliver a robust result. The Boehmer et al. test can be seen 
as a good complement to the other parametric test, Student’s t-test. The test statistic is given by 
the equation below, when testing for H 0: CAAR = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.15.5 Corrado’s Rank test 
On contrast to Student’s t-test and Boehmer et al.’s t-test, Corrado’s rank test is a non-paramet-
ric test, which means that test is useful when the requirements of the normal distribution are not 
met. Corrado’s rank test tests for abnormal security-price performance in event studies and the 
null hypothesis is that the average abnormal return is equal to zero. The test is conducted by 
ranking all abnormal returns for the complete sample of firms for both the estimation- and event 
period. In relation to the t-test, Corrado argues that his rank test is better specified under the 
null hypothesis and more powerful under the alternative hypothesis. To implement the rank test, 
Corrado explains in his article that it is first necessary to divide and transform each firm’s ab-
normal returns into ranks over the combined period. In the conducted test, a comparison of the 
ranks in the event period for each firm is made. The test statistic for the test is given by:   
S O U R C E :  B O E H M E R  E T  A L .  ( 1 9 9 1 )  
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5.15.6 Shapiro Wilk test for normality 
As we cannot assume that the average abnormal returns for all subsamples are normally dis-
tributed, a test for normality has been conducted on all subsamples. The aim of scanning the 
data for normality is to check whether a parametric- or a non-parametric test is more appropri-
ate. Parametric tests, such as Student’s t-test automatically assumes that each category of the 
independent variables is normally distributed while non-parametric tests, such as Corrado’s 
Rank Tests do not make any assumptions of the distribution. To test the sample for normal 
distribution, a test for normality is performed. When conducting a test for normality, there is a 
couple to choose from. These are Kolgomorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk, Anderson-Darling and 
Liliefors tests (Razali et al. 2011). However, according to recent research (Thode 2002 and 
Razali et al. 2011) the most reliable and commonly used test is the Shapiro-Wilk test. The 
Shapiro-Wilk test tests the distribution of the data under the null hypothesis that the data is 
normally distributed and presents the probability of normal distribution at chosen significance 
level. The importance of using a normality test to be able to detect non-normal distribution is 
dependent on size of the sample. Elliot (2007) proposes that it is always beneficial to ascertain 
the distribution of the data, unless the sample size is very larger (above 1000). In this study, the 
sizes of the different subsamples range from 30-594, which means that the sample benefits from 
performing a normality check. The chosen level of significance for Shapiro-Wilk will through-
out this study be the 5 % level. 
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The test statistic for Shapiro-Wilk is given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test is the most powerful when the variables are continuously measurable. 
The reason to include a test for normality in this study is to further enhance the reliability and 
eventually rule out the possibility of make wrong assumptions from the inferential statistics. 
The test for normality has been performed in IBM’s statistical program SPSS. Furthermore, the 
appropriateness of the normality test has been crosschecked by looking at the skewness and 
kurtosis of each subsample. According to Doane & Seward (2011), both the kurtosis and the 
skewness measure should be as close to zero as possible. However, in reality most data are 
skewed. When checking the data in this study, the manual check for skewness and kurtosis 
show no deviation from what was established from the Shapiro-Wilk test. 
5.15.7 Discussion of problems occurring from the cross-sectional correlation of ab-
normal returns 
Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) have written extensively on the topic of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis, when it in fact is valid. In this case, rejecting the true null hypothesis would lead to 
an error of the first kind and meaning that the full extension of abnormal return across the 
sample is not reflected in the result. To further validate the results of this study, an adjusted t-
test called Kolari & Pynnönen has been used when calculating the abnormal returns. 
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Chapter 6 Descriptive Statistics and Results  
This chapter starts with a presentation of the signals (cluster formations) used in the testing of 
the sample. After that, the obtained results will follow. Each subsample will be presented before 
an analysis follows. Thoughts connected to the results and the reasons for them will be stated.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This part of the chapter will be devoted to descriptive statistics. As previously stated, the pur-
pose of this study is to test how cluster formations generated from insider transactions function 
as a signal for an outsider investor to earn abnormal return by imitating the clusters. The outline 
of how clusters are detected was covered in section 5.3. It might be relevant to once again go 
over the way the clusters are formed in order for the reader to get an understanding of the results 
that will follow. Clusters are formed when three or more insiders either buy or sell the stock 
within a limited period of time (limited to 5 trading days). It could be the case that three insiders 
make the transactions on the very same day. However, in most cases the transaction are made 
scattered during the 5  trading days that functions as delimiter in terms of how much time that 
is allowed to elapse from the first to last third transaction. To further clarify, the definition of a 
week is not dependent on calendar weeks, but a rolling period of 7 days, starting from the day 
the first transaction is made. Also, it is the date when the insider transactions are made public 
that are measured in this study. If any obscurities remain regarding the formation of clusters, 
please read section 5.3. 
After having scanned the 125 657 insider transactions for clusters, rendered from purchases and 
sales in the stock, 2 659 signals were found. The signals and how the division between the 3 
subsamples looks like will be presented below in figures 6.1 – 6.6. 
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As can be seen in figure 6.1, the total number of cluster and hence the sample that will be tested 
in this study consists of 2 659 cluster formations. One cluster formation equals one signal and 
the proportion between purchases and sales is almost 4:3. 1532 purchase formations and 1127 
sale formations were detected for all firms during the time period between January 1st in 2005 
and 31st of December in 2014. Figure 6.2 shows how the clusters are divided during the 10 year 
period. One can see that insiders formed purchase clusters very frequently during 2008, 246 
compared to 41 sales cluster for the full year. Also, 2006 shows divergence from the overall 
pattern, with more sale cluster generated than ditto purchases.  
 
 
 
1532
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FIGURE 6.1
TOTAL SAMPLE OF CLUSTER SIGNALS
Purchases
Sales
S O U R C E :  E K  &  E R L I N DE R  ( 2 0 1 5 )  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Purchases 121 106 201 246 153 191 166 108 94 146
Sales 134 191 146 41 87 120 93 92 114 109
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FIGURE 6.2
CLUSTER SIGNALS PER YEAR
Purchases
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SOURCE:  EK &  ERL IN DER (2015 )  
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S O U R C E :  E K  &  E R L I N DE R  ( 2 0 1 5 )  
Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of signals found for the respective groups in subsample 1. 
Most notable is the fact that Small Cap-companies show the largest number of purchase signals 
among the three groups whereas for sales, Small Cap-companies produces the fewest signals. 
Large Cap-companies provided almost the same amount of clusters, 414 purchases and 397 
sales. The number of signals of each of the groups above will constitute the samples that will 
be tested for subsample 1. 
Figure 6.4 on the next page shows the division of clusters found for the respective industry 
groups. The different groups show large differences in the number of obtained signals. This 
was however in line with what to expect, since certain groups consists of a larger number of 
companies than others. For example, the groups Financials, Technology and Industrials make 
up almost 60 % of all companies on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm together while Oil & Gas 
counts for only 2,49 %. 
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SUBSAMPLE 1 :  S IZE OF FIRM
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The signals obtained for the third subsample are shown in figure 6.5. As can be seen, clusters 
formed during years of expansion dominate in numbers over clusters formed from recession 
years.  
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6.2 Inferential Statistics 
The following part of the study will cover the results obtained by testing the sample for signif-
icant cumulative abnormal return. All results will be presented in tables, where each row in the 
tables displays the result from a different event window. The layout will follow the same design, 
where the different event windows will be the following:  
 
Second row: Event day +1 day.  
Third row: Event day + 2 days 
Fourth row: Event day + 5 days 
Fifth row: Event day + 8 days 
Sixth row: Event day + 10 days 
 
The obvious point of interest is the cumulative average abnormal return (abbreviated CAAR) 
which varies for the different event windows. The results from the tests that has been performed 
on the sample will be shown in column 3 (Student’s t-test), column 4 (Boehmer et. al.), column 
5 (Corrado rank test) and column 6 (Shapiro-Wilk). All significant values are followed by as-
terisks (*) to improve the understanding of the results.  The test for normality, Shapiro-Wilk, 
tests the distribution of the data under the null hypothesis that it follows the normal distribution. 
As a consequence, the results from the Shapiro-Wilk test will be the natural point of departure 
when presenting the results, as this test indicates whether a parametric or non-parametric test is 
more suitable. All tables will be followed by comments on what interpretations to make from 
the results. Naturally, the shaping of the results will follow the outline of the three different 
subsamples, as laid out in section 5.3. This study investigates both purchases and sales, and 
accordingly the results will be presented per each subsample. However, in order to facilitate for 
the reader, the results from all purchases will be presented at first, followed by the presentation 
of all sales. An analysis of each subsample will be presented at the end of each subsection. This 
pattern will repeat three times, once for each subsample. Before moving to the section with the 
results, it is worth to reiterate this study’s hypothess: 
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H0 : Outsiders are not able to earn abnormal return by imitating cluster formation, 
formed from insider transactions. 
H1 : Outsiders are able to earn abnormal return by imitating cluster formations, formed 
from insider transactions. 
 
It is important to once again stress that the results below present outsiders’ possibility to earn 
abnormal return. However, as was mentioned in section 5.9, transaction costs is a must to in-
clude to get an understanding of what it really costs to buy and sell shares. Transactions costs 
in practice consists of two parts, first one being the spread and second one being commission 
fees. The spread has been incorporated in the statistical tests since the stock prices that are used 
consist of mid-prices. Commission fees on the other hand vary depending on various factors 
and cannot be incorporated in a way that it captures the true cost in a fair way. Therefore, the 
CAARs presenting the possibilities of earning abnormal returns should be interpreted with the 
knowledge that commission fees will have an effect on the actual return, albeit it being quite 
low. To see the commission fees for a set of Swedish brokers, see table 5.3. 
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6.2.1 Subsample 1. Size of firm 
The first subsample that has been tested and presented is the division made depending on firm 
size. The subsample is divided into six portfolios, were the results from each portfolio will be 
presented and explained. The six portfolios are classified according to the companies’ respec-
tive size (market capitalization) and the study makes the same break downs as NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm uses. The different portfolios that have been tested and the number of observed sig-
nals were further presented in section 5.3.1. These were: 
 
 Large Cap-companies 
 Mid Cap-companies 
 Small Cap-companies 
 
Once again, note that that sales and purchases are treated as different portfolios. The reason for 
splitting the sample up into two groups, sales and purchases, and looking at them individually 
is because the point of interest is the reaction from the events. If the study were to include sales 
and purchases in the same portfolio and treat them as equal transactions, the possibility of find-
ing evidence of significant abnormal return would be subject to noise.  
 
Subsample 1: Results from purchase portfolios  
Large Cap 
Table 6.1 below presents the results from the statistical tests performed on a portfolio consisting 
of all insider clusters found for purchases in Large Cap-companies. 
Table 6.1 Purchases in Large Cap-companies   
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event+1 day 0.0054 1.7181 2.3795 2.6782 0,002 
2. Event+2 days 0.0055 2.2375 2.8290 3.0070 0,008 
3. Event+5 days 0.0080 1.2007 1.7078 1.8215 0,083 
4. Event+8 days 0.0095 1.0000 1.2134 2.4694 0,076 
5. Event+10 days 0.0128 1.5131 1.6669 2.5185 0,092 
 
  
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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While this subsample consists of relatively many events, 414 to be exact, it cannot presumably 
be said to be of normal distribution. Hence, a normality test has been performed on the sample. 
The results from the Shapiro Wilk test, in the column to the right, indicate that for event win-
dows 1 and 2, the distribution is not normal, whilst for event windows 3, 4 and 5 the Shapiro-
Wilk test shows a normal distribution. The consequence of the differences in distribution will 
therefore be that a non-parametric test is more suitable for the two shortest event windows. The 
three longer event windows should be interpreted with a parametric test (Student’s t-test and 
Boehmer et al). CAAR ranges from 0,54% to 1,28% and seem to be increasing, as the number 
of days increases. However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any event window, mean-
ing that outsiders are not able to earn abnormal return from following insiders’ purchase cluster 
formations for Large Cap-companies. Also, interpreting the more robust parametric test 
(Boehmer et al.), leads to the same conclusion. No significance is found for any event window 
length. 
 
Mid Cap 
The portfolio of Mid Cap purchases consists of 524 cluster formations. Table 6.2 below presents 
the test results from a portfolio of cluster purchases for Mid Cap companies 
  
Table 6.2 Purchases in Mid Cap-companies. 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event+1 day 0.0005 0.2323 0.5323 -0.0167 0,134 
2. Event+2 days 0.0008 0.3429* 0.2359* 0.1177 0,122 
3. Event+5 days 0.0037 1.3780* 0.6530** 1.0001 0,08 
4. Event+8 days 0.0024 0.7796* 0.0372* 0.3533 0,071 
5. Event+10 days 0.0021 0.5753* 0.4562** 0.0788 0,092 
 
 
By applying the same procedure as for the previous table and start by looking at the normality 
test, the values for the Shapiro-Wilk test suggest that the distribution is normal for all event 
windows. Therefore, the parametric tests should be used to interpret the CAAR. The CAAR is 
significantly positive for all event windows except the shortest event window ending 1 day after 
the event. This is confirmed by both Student’s t-test and Boehmer et al.  Regardless of which 
of the test that is used, the CAAR is significant at all other event window at the 5% significance 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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level. The Boehmer et al. test confirms that the CAAR for event windows 3 and 5 show signif-
icance at the 1% level, indicating very strong significance. Overall, the results show that out-
siders are able to earn abnormal return for Mid Cap-companies for 4 out of 5 event window 
lengths.  
 
Small Cap 
Small cap companies provided 592 purchase cluster formations. Table 6.3 below presents the 
results. 
 
Table 6.3 Purchases in Small Cap-companies 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event+1 day 0.0084 1.9154 2.0955 1.8172 0,078 
2. Event+2 days 0.0140 2.7146* 2.7250* 2.4080* 0,067 
3. Event+5 days 0.0175 2.6884** 3.0172** 2.3618* 0,113 
4. Event+8 days 0.0140 1.9522** 2.0182** 0.6268 0,132 
5. Event+10 days 0.0154 2.0603* 1.9397* 0.3132 0,141 
 
 
The CAARs for the all five event windows is positive and vary between 0,84% and 1,54%. The 
CAARs follow the same pattern as for Large Cap-companies and seem to increase as the num-
ber of days from the event increases. The Shapiro-Wilk-test indicates that the assumptions be-
hind the normal distribution are met for all event windows, leading to the conclusion that the 
parametric tests are more suitable to use. Both Student’s t-test and Boehmer et al.’s test indicate 
abnormal return for the four longest event windows. Only the shortest event window, ending 1 
day after the event fails to provide outsiders the possibility of earning abnormal return, as the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected for this event window. Bottom line is, outsiders are able to 
earn abnormal return in Small Cap-companies for all event windows except the shortest event 
window. 5 days after the event, outsiders achieve the largest cumulative abnormal return of 
1,75% and 1,54%, 10 days after the event. An analysis of the results obtained from the portfolios 
consisting of purchases in subsample 1 will be presented at the end of this section. However, 
firstly results from the sales clusters will be given space. 
  
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Subsample 1: Results from sales portfolios  
The following subsection will present the results from the second part of the first subsample, 
that is, the results from sales transactions generated from cluster transactions. The breakdown 
of the sample is the same as it was in the previous part. However, what is important to bear in 
mind when looking at the presented table below is that CAAR now is a result of sales and if 
CAAR is negative, the result should be interpreted as that a negative abnormal return has been 
detected which ultimately means that outsiders are able to earn this return if short-selling6 the 
stock. 
 
Large Cap 
Table 6.1 below presents the results obtained from testing a portfolio of cluster formation based 
on insider sales in Large Cap-companies. The total number of signals for this portfolio was, as 
presented in section 6.1, 397 in total.   
Table 6.4 Sales in Large Cap-companies 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et. al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
Event + 1 day 0.0019 0.9364 1.5857 0.8958 0,091 
Event + 2 days -0.0001 -0.0382 0.3930 -0.1651 0,112 
Event + 5 days -0.0012 -0.4334 0.2280 -0.1829 0,103 
Event + 8 days -0.0020 -0.5534 -0.3732 -0.3097 0,187 
Event + 10 days -0.0017 -0.4296 -0.2094 0.0371 0,136 
 
 
The CAARs from sales in Large Cap-companies vary between -0,2% to 0,19% but are not 
significantly lower than zero for any event window.  Student’s t-test and the Boehmer et al. test 
do not show any significance the 5% level. Although the Shapiro-Wilk test indicates that the 
sample is normally distributed, the conclusion would be the same irrespective of distribution as 
there is no sign of a possibility to earn abnormal returns from the non-parametric test either. 
The conclusion of this is that outsiders are not able to earn abnormal return by following sales 
clusters for Large Cap-companies. 
  
                                                 
6 By short-selling a stock the investor makes money from declining stock prices. 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Mid Cap 
Moving over to the results from the portfolio consisting of sales clusters generated from trans-
actions by insiders in Mid Cap-companies, the results are presented in table 6.5 below.  
Table 6.5 Sales in Mid Cap-companies 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et. al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day -0.0044 -1.0109 -0.7333 -1.3085 0,048 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0072 -1.5281 -1.0851 -1.7358 0,045 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0232 -3.7894** -3.5888** -3.7981** 0,065 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0235 -3.3936** -3.2707** -3.2332** 0,054 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0289 -3.6722** -3.5668** -3.3694** 0,061 
 
 
The normality test indicates that CAAR should be interpreted with the parametric tests for the 
three longer event windows and the non-parametric rank test for the two shorter event windows. 
For Mid Cap-companies, the obtained results are very significantly smaller than 0 for the event 
windows ending five, eight and ten days after the event happened (the three longest). The cho-
sen significance level is here 1 %. The conclusion that can be drawn from Student’s t-test and 
the Boehmer et al. test is that for the three longer event window, very significant negative ab-
normal return is found. However, the value of the normality test is close 0,05 for all event 
windows (as can be seen in the column to the right). This means that albeit the above mentioned 
explanation of what test to use in the interpretation is correct, this is only valid at the 5 % level. 
Therefore, it is positive that if the Corrado Rank test was to be applied, the same conclusion 
would be drawn. Hence, the CAARs are significantly lower than 0 for the event windows end-
ing five, eight and ten days after the clusters are formed. The same conclusion is not possible 
to determine for the two shorter event windows, were the CAARs do not significantly diverge 
from 0. Conclusively, outsiders earn abnormal return of up to 2,89% for sales clusters on Mid 
Cap-companies. 
  
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Small Cap 
Table 6.6 below presents the findings from testing a portfolio of all cluster formation derived 
from sales in Small Cap-companies. 
 
Table. 6.6 Sales in Small Cap-companies 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event+1 day 0.0118 2.3852* 2.0602* 2.2050* 0,012 
2. Event+2 days 0.0091 1.8579 1.5326 1.5934 0,289 
3. Event+5 days -0.0021 -0.3405 -0.4763 -0.5327 0,043 
4. Event+8 days -0.0094 -1.3109 -1.5580 -1.1420 0,331 
5. Event+10 days -0.0166 -2.3414* -2.3286* -1.9908* 0,042 
 
 
As has been seen in the results from previous portfolios, the CAARs continuously grow in the 
same direction as time elapses from the event itself. The CAARs for the different event win-
dows vary from 1,18% the day after the cluster has been formed to -1,66% for the event ending 
10 days after the formation of the cluster. The Shapiro-Wilk test indicates that interpretations 
of the CAARs should be made with Corrado’s Rank test for event windows 1, 3 and 5. Event 
windows 2 and 4 should be interpreted with the parametric tests. However, both the parametric 
and non-parametric tests show the same results. The CAAR for the event window ending 10 
days after the event is statistically smaller than 0 meaning that the signal of three insider selling 
the stock in same company and thus forming a cluster is a powerful signal of a decline in the 
stock with 1,66%  up to the 10th  day that follows the release of the completion of the cluster. 
  
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Analysis Size of firm 
Purchase clusters 
After the having presented the CAARs from cluster formations based on firm size the immedi-
ate and most notable interpretation is that size of firm seems to have a significant impact. As 
the null hypothesis was rejected for a total of 8 out 10 event windows for Mid- and Small Cap-
companies (except the shortest event window ending the day after the event), the logical con-
clusion is that outsiders are able to earn abnormal return by using purchase clusters as signals 
of when to buy the stock. Outsiders are thus able to make as much as 1,75 % of abnormal return 
by following insiders from Small Cap-companies. Connecting the results to the theories of in-
formation asymmetry, the insight in the firms seems to differ with size. According to theory, 
larger firms should suffer less from information asymmetry due to more transparency. This is 
confirmed by the results, since outsiders cannot use purchase clusters for Large Cap-companies 
to earn abnormal returns. Moreover, the results for purchase clusters for Large Cap-companies 
indicate that the market is quick to incorporate transaction news, which makes it more difficult 
for outsiders to imitate insiders.  
 
The results obtained from the tests are in line with some of the previously discussed studies. In 
line with Seyhun (1986), the results from purchase clusters in this study indicate that CAAR is 
significantly larger than 0 for Mid Cap- and Small Cap-companies. Regarding the hypothesis 
of outsiders being able to earn abnormal return, the results indicate that when conducting the 
test with mid-price (which incorporates one part of transaction costs) possibilities exist. 
Jaffe (1974) made a distinction between different types of insiders but still found that insiders 
achieved abnormal return. Hence, Jaffe’s results are strengthened by the results presented. 
Moreover, the result from the first subsample confirms the results obtained by Cheuk et al. and 
Wong et al. (discussed in chapter 5) who found proof of abnormal returns in smaller firms. 
Much like the results presented for this subsample, Cheuk et al and Wong et al. did not find any 
significant level of abnormal return in larger companies. However, one difference between the 
obtained results in this study and the results obtained by Cheuk et al. is the abnormal return 
from Mid Cap-companies. As presented in table 6.5, results show that there exist possibilities 
for outsiders to earn abnormal return for several event windows length for the Mid Cap-com-
panies, which was not the case in study by Cheauk et al.  
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The results from the study conducted by Eckbo and Smith on Oslo Stock Exchange, who found 
a connection between insider transaction and negative CAAR, is not confirmed by the results 
from this study. As the model specifications differed, the results should not be compared. They 
performed their study on the Norwegian market and as this study focuses on the Swedish mar-
ket, with a reservation that Eckbo and Smith used a time-weighted model and not the identical 
subsample, no distinctive similarity can be found between the two Scandinavian markets..   
 
Sales clusters 
Figure 6.6 below illustrates the interesting connection that, regardless of firm size, the sales 
transactions seem to be subject to a lagging effect, since the CAARS for Mid- and Small Cap-
companies are showing an almost linear negative relationship relative to days passed since the 
event. The CAARs continuously grow into negative territory. The CAARs for Mid- and Small 
Cap-companies are undoubtedly negative for the longer event windows as the CAAR for the 
event windows ending 10 days after the event is -2,89% for Mid Cap-companies and -1,66% 
for Small Cap-companies. Connecting these finding with prevailing theories, the market seems 
to be slow with incorporating the information. That three insiders sell within five days of trading 
(thus forming a cluster) is obviously interpreted negatively and the abnormal return is signifi-
cantly larger than 0 after this has happened. However, it takes time for the market to react to 
the information and not seldom is the major plunge in stock prices not seen until around 5 days 
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after the actual event. Regarding the market efficiency hypothesis, prices do react to the infor-
mation. However, the reaction takes time and the market do not meet the requirements of a 
strong market. The informativeness of sales clusters is stronger than for purchase clusters, since 
the CAARs are diverging more from 0. The Mid Cap-companies show the strongest significant 
abnormal return which indicates that this is where outsiders are able to earn the largest abnormal 
return. The practical interpretation of this is that short-selling the Mid Cap-stocks would lead 
to significant returns. It’s definitely worth to mention that far from all stocks on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm are available for short-selling. Therefore, the opposite investment strategy 
could be applied, that is, if the investors owns a Mid Cap-stock where three insiders sell their 
company’s stock and forming a cluster, the investor should sell the holdings in order to avoid 
abnormal losses. The fact that sales transactions show larger signs of abnormal return than pur-
chases, is the contrary to Lakonishok and Lee’s (2001) results. They found no connections be-
tween insider sales and lower stock prices. The authors’ suggestion to the divergence in results 
might be due to this study’s scope of testing cluster transactions instead of single insider sales 
event. Clusters show proof of being a more powerful signal.   
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6.2.2. Subsample 2: Industry classification 
As the results from the first subsample were presented in the last section, focus will now shift 
to the second subsample of the study. In this subsample, the original sample has been divided 
into different portfolios depending on the companies’ industry classifications. The full line of 
arguments for the second subsample was presented in section 5.5.2. The basis of the industry 
classification is the ICB standard, which most stock exchanges around the world has adapted 
to. The companies included in this study has been classified accordingly and the 9 different 
groups has been tested separately (note that the 10th group, Utilities, didn’t provide any cluster 
formations and is hence ignored). In the same way as for subsample 1, the different groups are 
further separated into purchase clusters and sales clusters depending on the type of transaction. 
The results that are presented over the next pages include the following groups: 
 
- Financials 
- Telecom 
- Basic Materials 
- Consumer Services 
- Industrials 
- Technology 
- Consumer Goods 
- Oil & Gas 
- Health Care 
 
The approach regarding the lengths of the event windows is the same for this subsample as the 
previously presented one, that is, 5 different event windows has been tested for all portfolios. 
For a complete picture of the number of signals found for the different groups, the reader is 
advised to return to section 6.1 of this chapter were the signals were presented in detail. 
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Subsample 2: Results from purchase portfolios  
Tables 6.7-6.9 below will present the results from the tests based on purchase clusters. In several 
industries, no abnormal returns are to be expected for an outsider as since the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected on statistical grounds. Industries without possibilities for outsiders of earning 
abnormal return include: Industrials, Basic Materials, Technology, Consumer Service, Con-
sumer Goods and Telecommunications. Neither the parametric tests nor the non-parametric test 
show any CAARs for which the null hypothesis can be rejected. The CAARs for purchase for-
mations for these industries are therefore not significantly larger than 0. An interpretation of 
this is that outsiders are not able to earn abnormal return from the clusters generated for these 
firms. The results from the tests conducted on the purchase portfolios conducted on companies 
that did not provide significant CAARs can be seen in appendix 3. However three of the indus-
tries will be presented more in detail below. 
 
Table 6.7 Purchases in Financial companies according to the ICB classification 
 
 
Table 6.7 above presents the results from financial companies. The Shapiro-Wilk test in the 
right column indicates that the sample follows the normal distribution and the parametric tests 
should be used in the interpretation. The CAARs for all event windows are positive and ranging 
from 0,08% to 0,71% depending on the event window length. The two parametric tests show 
test results that reinforce the interpretation of outsiders being able to earn abnormal return for 
the two longer event windows (event windows 4-5) as the null hypothesis can be rejected for 
these event windows. Both Student’s t-test and Boehmer et al’s test support this conclusion. 
Outsiders cannot earn abnormal return for the three shorter event windows (event windows 1-
3). 
  
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 days 0.0008 0.4096 0.9246 0.3258 0,183 
2. Event + 2 days 0.0013 0.6461 1.2033 0.2326 0,164 
3. Event + 5 days 0.0031 1.2795 1.7857 0.4658 0,224 
4. Event + 8 days 0.0063 2.3250* 2.9610** 1.4904 0,124 
5. Event + 10 days 0.0071 2.3230* 2.9548** 1.5737 0,198 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6.8 Purchases in Oil & Gas-companies according to the ICB classification 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et. al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 days 0.0273 1.8832* 2.1737* 1.2574 0,001 
2. Event + 2 days 0.0425 2.9978** 3.2530** 2.0608* 0,000 
3. Event + 5 days 0.0618 3.2314** 3.4428** 2.3253* 0,000 
4. Event + 8 days 0.0630 2.2131* 2.5998** 1.7740* 0,001 
5. Event + 10 days 0.0790 3.1407** 3.7476** 1.7572* 0,002 
 
 
The test for normality, Shapiro-Wilk, indicate that the sample do not follow a normal distribu-
tion. Therefore, Corrado’s Rank test is better suited to use in the analysis of the CAARs. The 
CAARs are positive for all event windows and vary between 2,73% up to as much as 7,9%. 
Signals obtained from purchases in companies from the Oil & Gas industry show strong indi-
cations that a possibility to gain an abnormal return for outsiders exists. The Corrado Rank test 
show signs of strong significance for the event windows ending 2,5, 8 and 10 days after the 
event, hence meaning that outsiders might achieve abnormal return for all these event windows. 
 
Table 6.9 Purchases in Health Care-companies according to the ICB classification 
Event window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et. al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 days 0.0057 0.8103 1.2995 0.3281 0,107 
2. Event + 2 days 0.0127 1.6121 1.7923 0.8790 0,122 
3. Event + 5 days 0.0173 1.5679 1.7150 1.5657 0,045 
4. Event + 8 days 0.0304 2.0640* 2.3134* 1.8518* 0,005 
5. Event + 10 days 0.0360 2.3749* 2.2666* 2.0034* 0,002 
 
 
Table 6.9 above show the results from the tests conducted on companies classified as active 
within the Health Care industry. Shapiro-Wilk suggests that the sample is not normally distrib-
uted for the three longest event windows (event windows 3-5) and follow a normal distribution 
for the two shorter event windows (event window 1-2) . Student’s t-test do not offer the oppor-
tunity to reject the null hypothesis for the event windows were the test is best suited. Neither 
does the more robust Boehmer et al. The values from the Corrado Rank test allow the null 
hypothesis to be rejected for the two longest event windows (event windows 4-5). The signals 
obtained from purchase clusters in Health Care therefore show statistically significant CAAR 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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larger than 0 for the event windows 8 and 10 days after the event, respectively. The interpreta-
tion of this is that outsiders are able to earn cumulative abnormal return of as much as 3,6% 
until the 10th day after the event in Health Care-companies 
The analysis of purchase clusters from subsample 2 will be provided after the sales clusters 
have been presented. 
 
Subsample 2: Results from sales portfolios  
In the section below the results from the test conducted on portfolios consisting of sales clusters 
will be presented. The different portfolios consist of various amounts of observations and the 
complete list of signals that has been tested in this subsample is further presented in section 
6.1.Much like the results from the purchase transactions exhibited above, several industries do 
not show significant CAARs diverging from zero. These industries include: Industrials, Con-
sumer Services, Financials, Oil & Gas, Telecommunications and Health Care. The results from 
the tests conducted on these industries are presented in table in appendix 3. However, signifi-
cant CAARs were detected in three industries and the results from the tests will be discussed 
and interpreted in table 6.10-6.12 below. Basic Materials, Technology and Consumer Goods 
are the industry groups with signs of a possibility to gain an abnormal return for outsiders.  
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Table 6.10 Sales in Basic Material companies according to the ICB classification 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day -0.0112 -1.1152 -0.7464 -1.2419 0,022 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0099 -0.8672 -1.0224 -1.5311 0,223 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0172 -1.6031 -1.1627 -1.0150 0,046 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0257 -1.7602 -2.2102* -1.1509 0,425 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0346 -2.0338* -2.5085* -1.2211 0,385 
 
 
Table 6.10 show that the sample is normally distributed for the event windows ending 2, 8 and 
10 days after the event (event windows 2, 4 & 5). Therefore these event windows should be 
interpreted with the parametric tests. The remaining two event windows should be interpreted 
with the Corrado Rank test. The CAARs are negative across all event window lengths and vary 
between -1,12% and -3,46%. However, significance as measured by Student’s t-test is only 
detected for the event ending 10 days after the event which means that outsiders are only able 
to achieve abnormal return for this event window length and not the others. However, looking 
at the Boehmer et al. test, an indication of a significant level can besides ten days after the event 
be spotted eight days after the event. The p-value eight days after the event for Student’s t-test 
is fairly close to a significant level, a value of 0,0515, which indicates that the different result 
seen in the Boehmer et al. test is reasonable. To sum up, outsiders are able to earn abnormal 
return for event windows ending 8 and 10 days after the event with cumulative abnormal return 
of -2,57% and -3,46% respectively. 
 
Table 6.11 Sales in Technology companies according to the ICB classification 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day 0.0026 0.4279 0.3607 -0.2210 0,001 
2. Event + 2 days 0.0016 0.2711 0.3462 0.1062 0,021 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0095 -1.3292 -1.6299 -1.9975 0,000 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0156 -1.9470 -2.0946 -1.9966* 0,003 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0182 -2.1688* -2.2694* -1.9982* 0,003 
 
 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6.11 exhibits the results from the sales portfolio of Technology stocks. The Shapiro-Wilk 
test indicates that all event windows should be interpreted with a non-parametric test as the 
assumptions behind the normal distribution are not met. The CAARs are showing negative re-
turn and vary between 0,26% and -1,82%. Corrado’s Rank test shows that the event windows 
ending 8 and 10 days after the event are significant in the sense that outsiders are able to achieve 
abnormal return for these two event window lengths. For the remaining event windows (event 
windows 1-3) no significance is found and outsiders might thus not achieve abnormal return 
for those event windows. 
 
Table 6.12 Sales in Consumer Goods companies according to the ICB classification 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et. al. Corrado Rank Shapiro Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day -0.0025 -0.3909 -0.6906 -1.9888* 0,042 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0043 -0.6040 -0.8055 -1.6666 0,056 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0242 -2.2188* -2.1086* -2.5006* 0,032 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0296 -2.3085* -2.2731* -1.9918* 0,195 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0296 -2.0738* -1.7649* -1.6977 0,211 
 
 
Table 6.12 shows the results from the clusters formed from sales transactions made in compa-
nies classified as Consumer Goods. The normality tests indicates that the event windows ending 
2, 8 and 10 days after the event should be interpreted with a parametric test and the event win-
dows ending 1 and 5 days after the event should be analysed with a non-parametric test. For 
several event window length, CAARs are significant for the Consumer Goods companies. 
Looking at the event windows that should be interpreted with parametric tests, Student’s t-test 
shows strong significant CAARs for the event windows ending 8 and 10 days after the event. 
The same conclusion is made looking at the Boehmer et al. test, while the event window ending 
2 days after the event is not significant for any of the parametric tests. For the event window 
ending 1 day after the event, Corrado’s Rank test shows that the negative CAAR of -0,25% for 
the first event window is significant at the 5% level. Also, the event window ending 5 days after 
the event show significant a CAAR of -2,42%. Hence, the conclusion of the results from Con-
sumer Goods companies is that there exist an opportunity for outsiders to achieve abnormal 
return for event windows ending 1, 5, 8 and 10 days after the event with CAARs of -0,25%, -
2,42%, -2,96% and -2,96% respectively. 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Analysis Industry classification 
A majority of the different industry classifications, in both buy and sell transactions, showed 
no signs of significance. However, a few of the groups indicated a possibility for outsiders to 
gain abnormal returns. The results might be related to the study of Chaeuk et al (2006). Chaeuk 
et al.’s results implied that abnormal returns were found but of different levels depending on 
the industry. However one of their conclusions were that insiders across all of the industries 
proved to be successful in their ability to gain abnormal returns. According to Chaeuk et al., the 
strongest signs of significant CAARs were found in the financial companies. The financial in-
dustry in this study indicated a significant p-value for purchase clusters but it was far from the 
industry classification with the strongest and most significant CAARs. The cumulative abnor-
mal return for the Oil and Gas industry was larger, especially directly after the event. Looking 
at the results from the sales, there were no signs of significance at all for the financial portfolio. 
Chaeuk et al. found different levels of abnormal returns between the different industries, which 
is a similarity with this study. With that in mind it is important to remember that this study and 
the one by Chaeuk et al., were conducted on markets with differences with regards to size 
(Chaeuk et al. investigated the Hong Kong market) and legal aspects. Arguably, this could be 
one reason for the different results. Chaeuk et al.’s results also showed that sales lead to stronger 
signals than purchases. This result is not confirmed by the study’s result, as several of the in-
dustries were not statistically significant and thus such a general conclusion cannot be made. 
One aspect of the result is that the null hypothesis is more often rejected for the longer event 
windows than the shorter which indicates that the variance in the sample is large right after the 
event. This leads to the interpretation of the market not seemingly aware of how to evaluate the 
outcome of the new information. 
 
It could be argued that the strongest signs of outsiders’ abnormal return were seen in one of the 
industries with the smallest sample to test from, raising the question of the smaller sample not 
giving the most trustable results. Therefore, it is questionable if the result regarding the Oil & 
Gas industry is truly reliable. On the contrary, the authors would like to state that the significant 
result regarding the Financial industry is reliable since it was the largest sample to test from: 
The same conclusion is made in the case of the Health Care industry that also indicated a pos-
sibility to earn abnormal returns in the purchases by using the cluster formation as a signal of 
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when to buy the stock. Overall, the industry classification shows mixed results in terms of out-
siders not being able to achieve abnormal return by imitating insiders for most of the industries. 
This conclusion is valid for both sales- and purchase clusters.  
 
 6.2.3 Subsample 3: Phase of Business Cycle 
The third subsample that this study seeks to investigate is a division of the original sample based 
on what phase of the business cycle the transactions were made. Broadly speaking, the economy 
could either be expanding or contracting. Insider’s behaviour during different phases of the 
business cycle has been studied before (Lakonishok & Lee 2001 and Abumustafa & Nusair 
2011). Insiders tend to perform differently depending on the overall conditions of the market. 
The main idea behind this classification is to classify years of being either (1) years of expan-
sion, or (2) years of recession. As the companies in this study are of Swedish origin but have a 
large portion of their respective sales in foreign countries, an average of the GDP growth in 
Sweden, EU-15 countries and OECD countries has been used. The complete outline of how the 
sample division was made can be found in section 5.5.3. The signals for the cluster formations 
that has been used in this subsample and the distribution is presented in section 6.1. The port-
folios that have been tested are the following: 
 
- Cluster formations performed during years of Expansion 
- Cluster formations performed during years of Recession 
 
As for the previous subsamples both purchases and sales are included in the results but treated 
on individual bases. 
 
Subsample 3: Results from purchases made during years of expansion 
In table 6.13 below, the results from the tests conducted on a portfolio of purchase clusters 
during years of expansions are presented. The total number of signals in this subsample equals 
902.  
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Table 6.13 Purchases during years of expansion 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day 0.0019 1.2279 0.9166 0.3916 0,039 
2. Event + 2 days 0.0037 2.0766* 1.4664 0.6906 0,042 
3. Event + 5 days 0.0075 3.2460** 3.0351** 2.1782* 0,091 
4. Event + 8 days 0.0067 2.4962* 2.4382* 1.2938 0,129 
5. Event + 10 days 0.0067 2.3014* 2.1481* 1.1503 0,215 
 
 
The normality test has, as is customary, been performed to decrease the likelihood of misinter-
pretations. By looking at the values in column to the right, it can been concluded that the dis-
tribution can be assumed to be normal for the event windows ending 5, 8 and 10 days after the 
formation of the clusters. The two shorter event windows should be interpreted with the Corrado 
Rank Test. During the expansion years the results from the event study indicate positive CAARs 
for all event window lengths. Testing at a 5% significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected 
for 5, 8 and 10 days after the event. Both Student’s t-test and the Boehmer et al. test render the 
same results. As the two shorter event windows should be interpreted with the non-parametric 
test, the null hypothesis is not rejected for either of the event windows. Consequently, outsiders 
are able to earn abnormal return by using purchase cluster from expansion as a signal of when 
to buy the stock. Outsiders would earn up to as much as 0,75% on average for the event window 
ending 5 days after the formation of the cluster. 
 
Subsample 3: Results from purchases made during years of recession  
Table 6.14 Purchases during years of recession 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day -0.0012 -0.4478 -0.8600 -0.1613 0,125 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0009 -0.2973 -0.5119 -0.0103 0,092 
3. Event + 5 days 0.0031 0.8777 0.7615 0.8866 0,310 
4. Event + 8 days 0.0019 0.5005 0.3538 0.2056 0,287 
5. Event + 10 days 0.0013 0.3319 0.2676 0.0889 0,226 
 
 
No signs of significant CAARs can be read from table 6.14. With no signs of a significant p-
values the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which indicates that abnormal returns are not 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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possible to achieve. As a consequence, outsiders cannot earn abnormal return during years of 
recession, when using purchase clusters as a signalling tool. 
 
Subsample 3: Results from sales made during years of expansion 
Table 6.15 Sales made during years of expansion 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day 0.0021 0.9347 0.7305 -0.3697 0,045 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0007 -0.3222 -0.3490 -1.3149 0,076 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0087 -3.1584** -2.3760** -3.0081** 0,132 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0115 -3.7011** -2.9630** -2.9233** 0,178 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0134 -3.9385** -3.1653** -2.7642** 0,092 
 
 
Similar to the results interpreted for the purchase clusters during years of expansion, strong 
indications of very significant CAARs can be seen. Looking at the Student’s t-test as well as 
the Boehmer et al. test, the p-values are very significant (<0,01) for the event windows ending 
5, 8 and 10 days after the completion of the cluster formation. The same conclusion is drawn 
from the Corrado Rank test, which further increase the validity of the results. The Shapiro-Wilk 
test is equivocal in terms of how the values for the different event windows hovers around 0,05. 
Values above 0,05 level indicate that the use of parametric tests is favourable to the use of a 
non-parametric test. Eventually, the use of correct model specifications increases the likelihood 
of true interpretations. In this case, all the results indicate the same, that is, outsiders being able 
to earn abnormal returns for the three longer event windows. 
 
  
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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Subsample 3: Results from sales made during years of  recession 
Table 6.16 Sales made during year of recession 
Event Window CAAR Student’s t-test Boehmer et al. Corrado Rank Shapiro-Wilk 
1. Event + 1 day 0.0023 0.8589 0.7348 0.4902 0,001 
2. Event + 2 days -0.0022 -0.2269 -0.4667 -0.6753 0,021 
3. Event + 5 days -0.0105 -1.4073 -0.9215 -0.9406 0,006 
4. Event + 8 days -0.0079 -0.8727 -0.5524 -0.3662 0,056 
5. Event + 10 days -0.0163 -1.7404 -1.3250 -1.0836 0,065 
 
 
No signs of significant CAARs can be read from table 6.16. With no signs of significance, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected which indicate that no signs of abnormal returns can be 
achieved from sales made during years of recession. 
 
Analysis Phase of business cycle  
A clear relationship was found testing the phases of a business cycle. Both for purchases and 
sales, the test values showed strong significance during years of expansion, meaning that out-
siders are able to earn abnormal return during years when the economy is expanding. The cu-
mulative abnormal return that outsiders were able to maximally achieve is topping at 0,75% for 
purchases -1,34 % for sales. Both values were significant. However, during years of recession, 
neither purchases nor sales were significant meaning that outsiders are not able to earn abnor-
mal return during years of recession. The interpretation of the results points in a direction of a 
higher level of information asymmetry existing during the expansion years. The market is less 
effective in integrating the information of insiders’ transactions. According to Fama’s levels of 
efficiency, the market must be regarded as only fulfilling the requirements of the weakest form 
since outsiders are able to profit from the signals.  
 
Looking at the comparison between purchase clusters and sales cluster, the conclusion becomes 
clear. Once again, sales is proving to be a stronger signal than purchases. Figure 6.7 on the next 
page show the CAAR for the sales portfolios during expansion years and recession years. As 
can be seen, the effect of three insiders selling their stocks proved to trigger a reaction of de-
clining stock prices reaching around -1,50 %, starting from the day the of the release of the 
* Significant at 5 % level  ** Significant at 1% level 
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transactions. Note that only for the years of expansion, the test results were statistically signif-
icant. Connecting the result to the findings by Abumustafa and Nusair, who established that 
insider sales were more informative during bad times than good times, the conclusion is not 
fully confirmed by this study’s results. Comparing the clusters purchases to the clusters sales, 
the comparison quickly leads to the assumption of sales showing more significant divergences 
from 0. However, comparing the sales clusters from years of expansion to the dittos from years 
of recession, Abumustafa and Nusair’s findings are not confirmed since insiders’ transactions 
proves to be less informative during the recession years, that is, what Abumustafa and Nusair 
classified as bad times. A reason for this could be that this study investigates aggregated trans-
action while the study of Abumustafa and Nusair were looking at all insider transaction. Thus 
showing that cluster formations prove to signal a stronger informativness of sales than single 
insider sales events.  
 
Also, as has been pointed at earlier, the interpretation of the results should be made with regards 
to transaction costs. The practical result of using the strategy of imitating insider cluster for-
mations incurs a commission fees being paid for buying and selling the stock. Therefore, the 
actual results of adopting the strategy would be a couple of tenth a percent lower. 
To conclude the phase of business cycle, the results from this study show that the market is not 
efficient during years of expansion, since outsiders are able to earn abnormal return from imi-
tating insiders. For purchase clusters the cumulative abnormal return achieved is 0,75% for the 
event window ending 5 days after the formation of the cluster.  
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For sales, the same figure is -1,34%, achieved 10 days after the event. However, during reces-
sion years, the market is more effective in the sense that outsiders are not able to statistically 
profit from imitating insiders for neither sales nor purchases.  
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Chapter 7 Concluding Discussion 
This chapter will present a concluding discussion of the results presented in the previous chap-
ter. Thoughts connected to the results and the reasons for them will be stated. Finally, a prop-
osition for further studies will be suggested. 
 
7.1 Concluding discussion 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the possibility of imitating insiders’ transac-
tions on the Swedish stock market. A framework was set up to identify the possibly most strong 
signal of all, namely if three or more insiders conducted transactions during a period of five 
trading days. By scanning all transactions performed by insiders in companies on OMX 
NASDAQ Stockholm, 2 659 cluster formations were detected. These cluster formations formed 
the basis for the study. A division of the sample of clusters into subsamples based on firm size, 
industry classification and phase of business cycle was made. With a deductive approach of 
testing the hypothesis of outsiders’ ability to earn abnormal return, statistical tests have been 
performed on the different subsamples. A normality test was included in order to make sure 
that misinterpretations of the results were avoided. Both parametric and non-parametric tests 
have been used when best suited. Different from most other studies, both purchase and sale 
transactions have been incorporated in the study. The purpose has been on investigating outsid-
ers’ ability to earn abnormal return, and not insiders’. The main reason for this is that several 
studies have already concluded that insiders earn abnormal return from their investments 
(Lakonishok and Lee 2001, Seyhun 1988), especially when testing clusters (Jeng et al. 1994). 
Therefore, not the transaction date but the release date of the insider transactions has been used 
throughout the study. The results showed that the Swedish stock market is far from effective in 
the sense that several opportunities exist for outsiders to earn abnormal return. Purchase clusters 
in Mid Cap-companies exhibited an impressive abnormal return of 2,89% for the event window 
ending 10 days after the cluster formation was completed. Also, the market seems slow at adapt-
ing to the information of insider clusters, which indicate that Fama’s hypothesis of a strong 
market is not confirmed by the findings for the Swedish settings. More so, sales cluster showed 
an even larger impact than purchase clusters, with a cumulative average abnormal return of -
2,89% on Mid Cap-companies and -1,66% for Small Cap-companies. 
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Therefore, it is not without a reason that the authors conclude that cluster formations constitute 
a very strong signal for outsider to earn abnormal return.  
 
There is a saying that goes that insiders buy stocks for one and one reason only and that is to 
make money, while sales might to be due to a tons of reasons. However, the results from this 
study point in a different direction. The signal of three insiders selling the stock is, as has been 
concluded in this study, a very strong indicator of an approaching negative abnormal return. 
An explanatory idea as why to the results being so explicit could be that insiders make transac-
tions based on their own judgement of the true perceived value of the company. If a cluster 
formation has established, three or more insiders have made transaction in their company’s 
stock within a week. Bearing in mind the prohibition on trading 30 days before the release of 
financial reports, which reduces the number of days that insiders are allowed to trade, there 
must be strong underlying reasons. Why, if not for making money, would three insiders sell 
their company’s stock? With prevailing information asymmetry, especially in Mid- and Small-
companies in Sweden, imitating insiders proves to be a prosperous strategy. 
However, transactions costs should be taken into account when examining the results. This 
study has incorporated transaction costs in the testing model by using mid prices, that is, the 
average between bid- and ask quotes. True costs for buying and selling shares also include a 
commission fee paid by the investor to the broker. This cost occurs two times. Firstly when 
purchasing the shares and secondly when selling the shares. A list of commission fees for Swe-
dish brokers was presented section 5.9.  
 
A limitation the authors chose was to not construct a multiple regression model and therefore 
not incorporate all subsamples in one test. Focus was instead on the variety in the individual 
samples. This study was applied on the Swedish stock market and the results obtained are only 
possible to generalize for Swedish settings. The main reason for us not being able to draw fur-
ther generalizing conclusions is mainly due to the legislation surrounding insider trading. Each 
country has adopted its own set of rules and as long as the European Union do not follow up 
with previous proposition bills, a comparison of insider trading in different countries limps.   
 
The efficient market hypothesis was discussed in chapter 2 and figure 7.1 illustrates how the 
different forms of an efficient market might be achieved. In this study, outsiders’ ability to earn 
abnormal return has been proved for several subsamples, leading to the conclusion of a weak 
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form of market efficiency. Note, that for certain subsamples, no abnormal return was detected, 
thus leading to a strong form of market efficiency. It can be read from the figure that the form 
of efficient market not only depends on the possible achieved abnormal return but also on how 
insiders and outsiders act. The strongest form of market efficiency can be linked to the authors’ 
conclusion of Large Cap-companies, several of the industry classifications and the recession 
stage of the business cycle. In these cases, the market reacts on new information immediately 
and a high level of transparency is substantiated. On the contrary, a weak market indicates a 
possibility to beat the market since it does not incorporate all of the relevant information. The 
conclusion can further be that in the event of a weak efficient market does the theory of a ran-
dom walk not hold since the null hypothesis of no abnormal return can be rejected. 
 
 
It has been shown that, given the above statement, it is valuable to imitate insiders forming 
cluster formations for Mid- and Small Cap companies and during years of expansion. It was 
also proved valid that abnormal returns were obtained when the subsample was divided into 
industry categories, based on the ICB classification. In spite of small test samples in some of 
the groups, Oil & Gas, Financials and Health Care showed significant cumulative abnormal 
return, leading to the conclusion that outsiders are able to earn abnormal return within these 
industries. The signalling theory is, just like the other discussed theories, of importance for this 
study. When transactions are made, information about the firm is communicated to the market. 
Hence, signals are released and perceived by outsiders. Judging by the overall results, the mar-
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ket perceives sales as a stronger sign than purchases, leading to the conclusion that the informa-
tivness is larger for sales. With that in mind, insider would benefit from timing their sales care-
fully as the signal value is very strong. 
7.2 Proposals for further research 
The authors have in this study investigated a broad spectrum of different aspects concerning 
the possibility to hold abnormal returns. Naturally, there are still areas that could be of interest 
to do further research on.  
 
 Since cluster formations have been proved to be a strong signal, a possible new research 
perspective would be to redefine the requirements of a cluster. A proposal for further 
research is to define cluster formations as a minimum of four or even five transactions 
conducted within a trading week. This could possibly lead to a stronger signalling effect 
than the already strong definition that this study has used. 
 
 This study has investigated several subsamples to test for abnormal returns, both in pur-
chase and sale transactions. Instead of, like in this one, only conducting single regres-
sions for each sub-sample, it would be of interest to perform a multiple regression for 
all of the purchase transactions and a multiple regression for all of the sell transactions. 
The multiple regressions would extend and bring together an already thorough study 
and improve the predictability of the abnormal returns.  
 
 The focus in this study has solely been on the Swedish stock market. An opening for a 
future study is to broaden the perspective and to shift focus towards international stock 
markets. The angle becomes interesting as there are large difference in laws and regu-
lations for insider trading in different countries. 
 
 This study has concluded that it is possible for outsiders to achieve abnormal returns in 
especially Mid- & Small Cap-companies. Therefore, it would be of interest for further 
research to study the relationship between insider trading and dividends. The study 
could possibly work with the signalling theory and expand Del Brio & Miguel’s (2010) 
theory of a positive relationship between dividends and insider trading and the effect of 
combining different signals.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 The collaboration with Redeye 
The study that you’ve just read has been written as a master project by two students from the 
School of Economics and Management in Lund. While the journey of writing this study has 
finally come to an end, the road of exploiting the information insiders’ transactions still lies out 
there. The conceptual foundation behind the mispricing of instruments and picking up signal-
ling tools to quantify the effects has always intrigued investors across the globe. All from value 
investors such as Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffet to prop traders in Switzerland have one 
thing in common; they use money to make money. Many have looked for the Holy Grail, but 
few if any have found it. When searching the field for interesting subjects, the authors took 
contact with the Swedish financial advisory firm, Redeye. The authors joined forces with Björn 
Fahlén, head of research, and Alex Sattelmaier, analyst, to kick a few ideas around topics that 
would suitable for spending one semester exploring and interesting enough to yield results that 
might lead to implications outside of the fortress of academics that university sometimes is. 
During a meeting that took place at Redeye’s head office on Mäster Samuelsgatan in Stock-
holm, the idea of insider trading and outsiders’ possible ability to earn returns from imitating 
the insiders own transactions quickly came up for grab. Both parts were intrigued by the subject 
and the authors were given a free hand to choose a line of approach that seemed reasonable 
enough to fulfil the academic requirements. Björn and Alex were supportive in the sense that 
they encouraged the authors to invest the time in a subject that would give valuable insight into 
something that academics all across the globe spend time researching. It is worth to mention 
that no compensation has been received whatsoever and the collaboration has been based on a 
shared fascination for financial markets. Redeye have been kind enough to provide valuable 
information regarding insider transactions, something that has facilitated the work process tre-
mendously. All transactions undertaken by insider are publicly available but FI’s insider regis-
ters do not meet the standard of an up-to-date database of 2015. Note that this opinion are solely 
the authors’. Hence, the collaboration between the authors and Redeye has been the opposite of 
reluctant and has in no way influenced the work process nor the results.  
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Appendix 2 Companies included in the study 
Companies included from OMX Stockholm Large Cap 
 
AARHUS-
KARLSHAMN 
ABB LTD N (OME) 
AFRICA OIL (OME) 
ALFA LAVAL 
ASSA ABLOY 'B' 
ASTRAZENECA 
(OME) 
ATLAS COPCO 'A' 
ATLAS COPCO 'B' 
ATRIUM LJUNG-
BERG 'B' 
AUTOLIV SDB 
AXFOOD 
AXIS 
BETSSON 'B' 
BILLERUD 
KORSNAS 
BOLIDEN 
CASTELLUM 
COM HEM HOLD-
INGS 
ELECTROLUX 'A' 
ELECTROLUX 'B' 
ELEKTA 'B' 
ENQUEST (OME) 
ERICSSON 'A' 
ERICSSON 'B' 
FABEGE 
FASTIGHETS 
BALDER 'B' 
GETINGE 
HENNES & MAU-
RITZ 'B' 
HEXAGON 'B' 
HEXPOL 'B' 
HOLMEN 'A' 
HOLMEN 'B' 
HUFVUDSTADEN 
'A' 
HUFVUDSTADEN 
'C' 
HUSQVARNA 'A' 
HUSQVARNA 'B' 
ICA GRUPPEN 
INDUSTRIVAR-
DEN 'A' 
INDUSTRIVAR-
DEN 'C' 
INDUTRADE 
INTRUM JUSTITIA 
INVESTOR 'A' 
INVESTOR 'B' 
JM 
KINNEVIK 'A' 
KINNEVIK 'B' 
LATOUR INVEST-
MENT 'B' 
LIFCO B 
LOOMIS 'B' 
LUNDBERG-
FORETAGEN 'B' 
LUNDIN MINING 
SDB 
LUNDIN PETRO-
LEUM 
MEDA 'A' 
MELKER 
SCHORLING 
MILLICOM 
INTL.CELU.SDR 
MODERN TIMES 
GP. 
MODERN TIMES 
GP.MTG 'B' 
MTG 'A' 
NCC 'A' 
NCC 'B' 
NIBE INDUSTRIER 
'B' 
NOBIA 
NORDEA BANK 
ORIFLAME COS-
METICS SDR 
PEAB 'B' 
RATOS 'A' 
RATOS 'B' 
SAAB 'B' 
SANDVIK 
SCA 'A' 
SCA 'B' 
SEB 'A' 
SEB 'C' 
SECURITAS 'B' 
SKANSKA 'B' 
SKF 'A' 
SKF 'B' 
SSAB 'A' 
SSAB 'B' 
STORA ENSO 'A' 
STORA ENSO 'R' 
SWEDBANK 'A' 
SWEDISH MATCH 
SWEDISH OR-
PHAN BIOVITRUM 
SVENSKA HAND-
BKN.'A' 
SVENSKA HAND-
BKN.'B' 
TELE2 'A' 
TELE2 'B' 
TELIASONERA 
TIETO CORPORA-
TION (OME) 
TRELLEBORG 'B' 
WALLENSTAM 'B' 
VOLVO 'A' 
VOLVO 'B' 
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Companies included from OMX Stockholm Mid Cap 
 
ACTIVE BIOTECH 
ADDTECH 'B' 
ÅF 'B'  
ARCAM 'B'  
AVANZA BANK 
HOLDING 
B&B TOOLS 'B' 
BACTIGUARD HOLD 
BEIJER ALMA 'B' 
BEIJER REF AB 
BILIA 'A'  
BIOGAIA 'B' 
BLACKPEARL RE-
SOURCES SDR 
BUFAB  
BURE EQUITY 
BYGGMAX GROUP 
CATENA  
CAVOTEC  
CLAS OHLSON 'B' 
CLOETTA 'B' 
CONCENTRIC 
COREM PROPERTY 
GROUP  
DIOS FASTIGHETER 
DUNI  
EAST CAPITAL EX-
PLORER 
ENIRO  
FAGERHULT 
FAST PARTNER 
FENIX OUTDOOR 
INTL 
FINGERPRINT 
CARDS 'B' 
GRANGES  
GUNNEBO  
HALDEX  
HEBA 'B'  
HEMFOSA 
FASTIGHETER 
HIQ INTERNA-
TIONAL 
HMS NETWORKS 
INDL.& FINL.SYS.'B' 
INDL.& FINL.SYS.'A' 
INWIDO  
ITAB SHOP CON-
CEPT 'B' 
KAPPAHL  
KLOVERN B 
KLOVERN A 
KUNGSLEDEN 
LAGERCRANTZ 
GROUP 'B' 
LINDAB INTERNA-
TIONAL 
LUCARA DIAMOND 
LUNDIN GOLD 
(OME) 
MEDIVIR 'B' 
MEKONOMEN 
MUNKSJO (OME) 
MYCRONIC 
NEDERMAN HOLD-
ING 
NET ENTERTAIN-
MENT  
NE 'B'  
NEW WAVE GROUP 
'B' 
NGEX RESOURCES 
NOLATO 'B' 
NORDNET 'B' 
NP3 FASTIGHETER 
OASMIA PHARMA-
CEUTICAL 
OEM INTERNA-
TIONAL 'B' 
OPUS GROUP 
ORESUND INVEST-
MENT 
OREXO  
PLATZER 
FASTIGHETER 
PROFFICE 'B' 
QLIRO GROUP 
RECIPHARM AB 
REZIDOR HOTEL 
GROUP 
SAGAX  
SAGAX 'B'  
SAS  
SCANDI STANDARD 
SECTRA 'B'  
SEMAFO (OME) 
SKISTAR 'B' 
SWECO 'A'  
SWECO 'B'  
SWEDOL 'B' 
SYSTEMAIR 
TETHYS OIL 
THULE GROUP 
TRANSCOM WW 
TRANSMODE 
TRIBONA  
UNIBET GROUP SDB 
VBG GROUP 
VICTORIA PARK 
VICTORIA PARK B 
VITROLIFE  
VOSTOK NAFTA 
INV.SDR 
WIHLBORGS 
FASTIGHETER 
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Companies included from OMX Stockholm Small Cap 
ACANDO 'B'
  
ADDNODE 'B' 
AEROCRINE 'B' 
ALLENEX  
ALLTELE  
ALLM.SVEN.TELAB 
ANOTO GROUP 
ARCTIC PAPER 
(OME) 
ARISE  
AVEGA GROUP 'B' 
BE GROUP  
BEIJER ELECTRON-
ICS 
BERGS TIMBER 'B' 
BESQAB PROJEKT & 
FASTIGH  
BIOINVENT INTL. 
BIOTAGE  
BJORN BORG 
BLACK EARTH 
FARMING SDB 
BONG  
BOULE DIAGNOS-
TICS (WI) 
BTS GROUP 
BULTEN  
CELLAVISION 
CONCORDIA MARI-
TIME 'B'  
CONSILIUM 'B' 
C-RAD 'B'  
CTT SYSTEMS 
CYBERCOM GROUP 
EUROPE  
DEDICARE  
DGC ONE  
DORO  
DUROC 'B'  
ELANDERS 'B' 
ELECTRA GRUPPEN 
ELOS 'B'  
ENDOMINES 
ENEA  
EOLUS VIND B 
EPISURF MEDICAL 
ETRION (OME) 
EWORK SCANDINA-
VIA 
FEELGOOD SVEN-
SKA 
FORMPIPE SOFT-
WARE 
G5 ENTERTAIN-
MENT 
GEVEKO 'B' 
GLOBAL HEALTH 
PARTNERS  
HEMTEX  
I A R SYSTEMS 
GROUP 
IMAGE SYSTEMS 
INTELLECTA 'B' 
KABE HUSVAGNAR 
'B' 
KARO BIO  
KAROLINSKA DE-
VELOPMENT (WI) 
KNOW IT  
LAMMHULTS DE-
SIGN GROUP 
MALMBERGS EL-
EKTRISKA 'B' 
MICRO SYSTEMA-
TION 'B' 
MIDSONA 'A' 
MIDSONA 'B' 
MIDWAY HOLDINGS 
'A' 
MIDWAY HOLDINGS 
'B' 
MOBERG PHARMA 
MQ HOLDING 
MSC KONSULT 'B' 
MULTIQ INTERNA-
TIONAL 
NET INSIGHT 'B' 
NEUROVIVE PHAR-
MACEUTICAL 
NORDIC MINES 
NORDIC 
SER.PTNS.HDG.'B' 
NOTE  
NOVESTRA  
NOVOTEK 'B' 
ODD MOLLY INTL. 
OPCON  
ORTIVUS 'A' 
ORTIVUS 'B' 
OSCAR PROPERTIES 
PA RESOURCES 'B' 
PARTNERTECH 
POOLIA 'B'  
PRECISE BIOMET-
RICS 
PREVAS 'B'  
PRICER 'B'  
PROACT IT GROUP 
PROBI  
PROFILGRUPPEN 'B' 
RAYSEARCH 
LABS.'B' 
REDERI AB 
TNSAT.'B' 
REJLERS B  
RNB RETAIL AND 
BRANDS 
ROTTNEROS 
SEAMLESS DISTRI-
BUTION 
SEMCON  
SENSYS TRAFFIC 
SHELTON PETRO-
LEUM 
SINTERCAST 
SOFTRONIC 'B' 
STOCKWIK FOR-
VALTNING 
STUDSVIK  
SVEDBERGS I 
DALSTORP 'B' 
TRACTION 'B' 
TRADEDOUBLER 
TRIGON AGRI 
UNIFLEX 'B' 
VENUE RETAIL 
GROUP 'B' 
VITEC SOFTWARE 
GROUP 'B'  
XANO INDUSTRI 'B' 
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Delisted included companies OMX Stockholm All caps 
 
ACADEMEDIA  
ACAP 
AFFÄRS-
STRATEGERNA AB  
ALLIANCE OIL 
ASPIRO 
AUDIODEV AB  
AVAILO 
BIOLIN SCIENTIFIC  
BORÅS WÄFVERI AB  
BOSS MEDIA  
BRINOVA 
BROSTRÖM  
CARDO  
CARL LAMM AB  
CARNEGIE & CO AB  
CASHGUARD AB  
CONNECTA 
DAGON 
DIN BOSTAD 
DIREKT AB  
ELEKTRONIKGRUP-
PEN 
FAZER KONFEKTYR  
GANT  
GUNNEBO INDUS-
TRIER  
HL DISPLAY  
HÖGANÄS 
HOME PROPERTIES  
HQ AB  
HUMAN CARE HC 
AB  
KMT GROUP  
LBI INTERNA-
TIONAL  
LEDSTIERNAN  
MODUL 1 DATA  
MUNTERS AB  
NEONET XPONCARD 
GROUP AB 
NETONNET  
NEXUS TECHNOL-
OGY AB 
NILÖRNGRUPPEN 
NOBEL BIOCARE  
NOVACAST TECH-
NOLOGIES AB 
ORC GROUP 
OXIGENE INC 
Q-MED 
READSOFT  
RÖRVIK TIMBER 
SCANIA AB 
SECURITAS  
SKANDITEK INDUS-
TRIFÖRVALTNING 
AB 
SVITHOID TANKERS 
AB 
SWITCHCORE AB 
TELELOGIC  
TELIGENT AB 
TICKET TRAVEL 
GROUP 
TILGIN 
TRICORONA 
ZODIAK TELEVI-
SION AB 
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Appendix 3 
Results from subsample 2: purchase clusters  
Industrials 
Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Event + 1 days 0.0018 0.6446 0.1453 
Event + 2 days 0.0026 0.8168 0.1230 
Event + 5 days 0.0005 0.1366 1.1487 
Event + 8 days 0.0014 0.3394 0.7492 
Event + 10 days 0.0035 0.8667 0.2829 
 
Basic Materials 
Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Event + 1 days 0.0088 1.2815 1.4128 
Event + 2 days 0.0090 0.9695 0.7298 
Event + 5 days 0.0171 1.2242 1.5385 
Event + 8 days 0.0077 0.5427 0.4210 
Event + 10 days 0.0046 0.3043 0.0582 
 
Technology 
Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Event + 1 days 0.0067 1.0608 0.6268 
Event + 2 days 0.0097 1.0556 0.4148 
Event + 5 days 0.0152 1.4160 0.9604 
Event + 8 days 0.0121 1.0948 0.3234 
Event + 10 days 0.0163 1.4310 0.9584 
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Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Consumer Service     
Event + 1 days 0.0013 0.2370 0.2232 
Event + 2 days 0.0017 0.2909 0.2668 
Event + 5 days 0.0096 1.2672 1.0329 
Event + 8 days 0.0067 0.8574 0.2314 
Event + 10 days 0.0018 0.1988 0.4444 
 
Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Consumer Goods     
Event + 1 days 0.0026 0.5503 0.9245 
Event + 2 days 0.0006 0.1133 0.4714 
Event + 5 days 0.0034 0.5378 0.2227 
Event + 8 days 0.0042 0.5514 1.0047 
Event + 10 days 0.0013 0.1627 0.6435 
 
Date CAAR Student’s t-test Corrado Rank 
Telecommunications   
Event + 1 days 0.0137 1.6442 1.8391 
Event + 2 days 0.0080 0.8672 0.5015 
Event + 5 days 0.0053 0.5589 0.3330 
Event + 8 days 0.0058 0.5833 0.5258 
Event + 10 days 0.0040 0.4187 0.4063 
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Results from subsample 2: sales clusters 
Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Industrials 
Event + 1 day 0.0023 0.8521 1.7031 1.1857 
Event + 2 days -0.0017 -0.5622 0.4787 -0.3239 
Event + 5 days 0.0002 0.0470 1.4341 0.7365 
Event + 8 days -0.0015 -0.3241 1.0925 0.6579 
Event + 10 days -0.0029 -0.5961 0.7642 0.3288 
 
Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Consumer Services 
Event + 1 day 0.0016 0.3275 0.7659 0.7607 
Event + 2 days 0.0003 0.0604 0.3143 0.4502 
Event + 5 days -0.0102 -1.3993 -1.1807 -0.6986 
Event + 8 days -0.0024 -0.2840 -0.5713 0.1685 
Event + 10 days -0.0126 -1.2782 -1.3374 -0.5019 
 
Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Financials 
Event + 1 day 0.0016 0.3275 0.7659 0.7607 
Event + 2 days 0.0003 0.0604 0.3143 0.4502 
Event + 5 days -0.0102 -1.3993 -1.1807 -0.6986 
Event + 8 days -0.0024 -0.2840 -0.5713 0.1685 
Event + 10 days -0.0126 -1.2782 -1.3374 -0.5019 
 
Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Oil & Gas 
Event + 1 day 0.0102 1.7830 0.7590 0.2605 
Event + 2 days 0.0084 1.5642 0.4411 0.2444 
Event + 5 days 0.0072 1.2911 -0.0965 -0.4174 
Event + 8 days 0.0025 0.4578 -1.1368 -1.5916 
Event + 10 days -0.0016 -0.3031 -1.3945 -1.6115 
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Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Telecommunications 
Event + 1 day 0.0071 1.6997 1.5043 1.2890 
Event + 2 days 0.0080 1.1036 0.6048 1.0400 
Event + 5 days 0.0104 1.0883 0.6232 0.7645 
Event + 8 days -0.0017 -0.1661 -0.4475 0.5084 
Event + 10 days 0.0019 0.1439 -0.1456 0.6514 
 
Event Window CAAR T-test Boehmer et. Al. Corrado Rank 
Health Care 
Event + 1 day 0.0058 0.6383 0.1131 0.0369 
Event + 2 days -0.0007 -0.0852 -0.5036 -0.6158 
Event + 5 days -0.0164 -1.4955 -1.5134 -1.5674 
Event + 8 days -0.0117 -0.7140 -0.6537 -1.0672 
Event + 10 days -0.0176 -1.0710 -1.0412 -1.3058 
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Kluster, genvägen till utökat stu-
diebidrag?  
Lundastudenterna Philip Ek och Karin 
Erlinder har tagit sig an den svenska aktie-
marknaden. Genom att identifiera kluster av 
köp- och säljtransaktioner har de testat om 
onormal avkastning kan uppnås efter imitat-
ion av insiders. 
Insider trading är ett allsidigt ämne med både en 
legal och en illegal del. Studenterna Philip Ek 
och Karin Erlinder valde att i sin magisterupp-
sats på Civilekonomprogrammet i Lund studera 
den legala delen av insider trading, applicerat på 
den svenska marknaden. Insider trading utgör 
ett väl beforskat område vilket gjorde vikten av 
att skapa nytänkande hypoteser tyngre. Skriben-
terna valde att fokusera på den svenska mark-
naden vilket gjorde att det inte till fullo var att 
förvänta likadana resultat som tidigare erkända 
studier, däribland Seyhun, hade uppnått. Vid in-
tervju med herr Ek och fröken Erlinder förklarar 
de att de alltid har varit intresserade av om det 
är möjligt att ”slå marknaden” och att det var 
detta som ledde in på insider trading och teori-
erna kopplade till ämnet. För att sticka ut från 
tidigare uppsatser publicerade i Sverige valde 
de att, likt forskaren Seyhun, att arbeta med 
kluster och att dela upp testurvalet i ett flertal 
grupper. 
Fokus i studien 
Samtliga köp- och säljtransaktioner, gjorda på 
den svenska marknaden, mellan åren 2005-
2014, i stora, medelstora och små företag har 
behandlats, detta för att ge ett djup i analysen. 
Det innebär att allt från de stora företagen såsom 
Alfa Laval och Volvo till de mindre likt Hem-
tex, har behandlats. Vidare berättar Ek och 
Erlinder att de vid genomgång av samtliga 
transaktioner identifierade kluster som definie-
rades som händelser då tre eller fler gjorda insi-
der transaktioner skedde. Vid intervjun med 
forskarna vill de poängtera den stora mängden 
data som har behandlats, i förhoppningen om att 
få ett så precist resultat som möjligt. Det ur-
sprungliga urvalet bestod av 125 657 transakt-
ioner som sedan filtrerades tills det kvarstod 
50 124 aktietransaktioner. Ur dessa transakt-
ioner identifierades sedan 2 659 kluster.  
Vidare valde författarna att skapa tre olika del-
prover som eventstudier (metod för att mäta in-
verkan av händelser, red 
anm) skulle genomföras på. 
De utvalda fördjupningarna 
blev företagsstorlek, indu-
stritillhörighet och fas av 
konjunkturcykeln.  
Företagsstorlek 
Möjligheten att uppnå över-
avkastningar i olika före-
tagsstorlekar har varit fastställt i ett flertal län-
der och nu även i Sverige. Författarna hänvisar 
bland annat till Piotroski och Roulstone som har 
påvisat att det finns möjligheter att imitera insi-
ders för att uppnå onormala avkastningar, med 
en fördel mot de mindre företagen. Ek och 
Erlinder finner likvärdiga resultat i sin studie på 
den svenska marknaden, dock utan att utesluta 
att samma effekt kan återfinnas i medelstora fö-
retag då det även fanns en tydlig signifikant 
överavkastning i dessa. Då Ek och Erlinder 
125 657 
Insider 
Transaction
50 124  Stock 
Transactions
2 659  
Insider 
clusters
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valde att titta på både köp- och säljtransaktioner 
gjordes även en uppdelning mellan dessa i sam-
band med testandet. Säljtransaktioner visade ett 
större signalvärde än köptransaktioner, vilket 
nu har skapat ett ramaskri i forskningsvärlden. 
”Ett slag under bältet”, som adjunkt Rolfsson 
från företagsekonomiska institutionen vid 
Lunds Universitet, kommenterade resultat. ”Att 
jag själv inte tänkt i dessa banor gör mig upp-
riktigt förbannad. Nåväl, jag hoppas innerligt att 
Ek och Erlinder blir rikligt belönade i december 
när årets Nobelpristagare i ekonomi ska tillkän-
nages”, fortsätter Rolfsson. 
Industritillhörighet    
De valda industrierna finns bestämda av Indu-
stry Classification Benchmark (ICB) och pre-
senteras som nio olika; Financials, Technology, 
Basic Materials, Consumer Service, Consumer 
Goods, Oil and gas, Industrials, Utilities, Health 
Care och Telcom. I sin analys gör författarna en 
reservation för att antalet testade företag i de 
olika industrierna skiljer sig åt vilket även kan 
återspegla resultatet. Sett till studien kan Ek och 
Erlinder påvisa signifikanta onormala avkast-
ningar i ett fåtal av industrierna på den svenska 
marknaden, både gällande köp- och säljtrans-
aktioner. Dock hittades inget samband mellan 
de signifikanta industrierna i köptransaktion-
erna jämfört med de signifikanta industrierna i 
säljtransaktionerna då de enligt resultatet var 
olika. Störst chans till att lyckas imitera insiders 
och därmed uppnå onormal avkastning åter-
fanns i oil och gas industrin. Författarna berättar 
vidare att det var en av industrierna med endast 
ett fåtal företag i och att industrin financials, 
som även den påvisade en möjlighet att imitera 
insiders för att få erhålla överavkastningar, 
istället var mer relevant att analysera då företa-
gen var fler och därför kan ha gett ett mer exakt 
svar. Trots detta föringar Ek och Erlinder inga 
resultat utan tar alla i beaktning. 
Fas av konjunkturcykeln 
Studenterna förklarar vidare att de två ovan 
nämnda deltesterna är vanligt förekommande i 
studier om insider trading. De valde på grund 
utav det även ett tredje deltest, vilket blev att 
studera de två faserna i konjunkturcykeln; ex-
pansionen och recessionen. Till lite förvåning 
fann de väldigt tydliga resultat som visade att 
den största chansen för en utomstående att imi-
tera en insider och därmed tjäna på detta var i 
expansionsfasen, både i köp- och säljtransakt-
ioner.  
Efter en uppsats 
Ek och Erlinder hoppas att de har bidragit med 
ett djup till tidigare studier på den svenska 
marknaden och framförallt en variation då ma-
joriteten enbart har undersökt köptransaktioner. 
Enligt författarna finns lika intressanta analyser 
att göra i säljtransaktioner och innan intervjun 
avslutades flikade de in att ju längre tiden går 
med en uppsats desto mer har de lärt att vink-
larna för nya undersökningar är enorma. De 
själva önskar att någon inriktar sig på en multi-
pel regression för att kunna knyta ihop de olika 
delproverna till ett test. Väl rutet säger vi på re-
aktionen.
  
